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The Marikana Massacre of 16th August 2012 was a watershed moment for post-
Apartheid South African politics. News headlines and images depicting an ANC-led 
South African police killing 44 unarmed miners, striking for a wage increase, ruptured 
the TRC’s official narrative that state violence of this proportion belonged to a bygone 
colonial, or Apartheid past. Following the massacre, the Marikana Commission of 
Inquiry was launched as an official inquiry into what was referred to as the ‘tragic 
incidents at Marikana’. However, as the Commission conducted its work its actual role 
became increasingly ambivalent and ambiguous to the public, as well as to witnesses 
who testified. Legally, it was a judicial commission of inquiry with a strict fact-finding 
mandate, yet the official discourse invoked suggests it had additional distinctive aims to 
achieve ‘truth, restoration, and justice’, which are functions traditionally associated 
with Truth Commissions, in the field of Transitional Justice, and more particularly with 
South Africa’s TRC. 
This ambiguity in the Marikana Commission’s function points to the larger issue that 
this thesis addresses – the ambiguity in the exact role and function of, as well as the 
relationship between, generic commissions of inquiry and Truth Commissions. The 
functions are interrogated using the concept of ‘tumult commissions’, introduced by 
Adam Sitze-- a subtype of commission of inquiry used by colonial administrations in 
lieu of criminal tribunals, to investigate political violence following the State’s violent 
suppression of some major insurgency. Over and above ‘fact-finding’, Sitze claims that 
‘tumult commissions’ were political tools deployed to ‘whitewash’ and justify State 
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killings as unfortunate necessities in order to restore peace and order, and to legitimate 
the authority of the state.  
I anchor the current ambiguity in the role of the Marikana Commission, both in legal 
capacity, its method and official discourse, in a longer historical trajectory that extends 
from the Jamaica Royal Commission (1866) to the Sharpeville Commission (1960) and 
the TRC (1996-1998). The notion of official truth-seeking is problematised using an 
analytical framework that distinguishes between objective ‘fact-finding’, ‘truth-seeking’ 
and the various associated narrative genres of ‘tumult commissions’ and ‘truth 
commissions’. Through a critical analysis of canonic academic literature, official 
commission reports and legislation, the thesis highlights glaring contradictions and 
inconsistencies in claims to official ‘truth-seeking’ when combined with quasi-judicial 
aims to achieve accountability and ‘justice’. It concludes that the ‘truth’ of ‘official’ truth-
seeking commissions is always constrained by the overall objectives of the government 
of the day. Although the TRC was able to promote a more open and inclusive institution 
to deal with the intractable issues of ‘truth’ and ‘accountability’ following state-
sanctioned violence, the cases show that when broader social and economic issues are 
excluded from the ‘regime of truth’ of official commissions, it only creates fertile soil in 
which similar tragedies may reoccur in a post-colonial, and post-TRC South Africa.   
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Chapter 1: Official ‘Truth finding’ after State Violence 
 
1.1 Introduction 
“It is the State which first presents subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose of 
History, but involves the production of such history in the very progress of its own being” - 
Hegel1 
The Marikana Commission of Inquiry was appointed on September 12th, 2012 and in 
terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Its 
task was to investigate what has been repeatedly referred to as “the tragic incident”2 on 
16 August 2012, when the South African Police Services (SAPS) fatally shot 44 people, and 
injured over one hundred at the Lonmin mine in Marikana, where miners had been 
engaging in an unprotected strike demanding a wage increase. The Marikana Massacre 
presents the worst case of state security forces’ brutality since the African National 
Congress (ANC) assumed government after South Africa’s first national democratic 
election in 1994. It rivals the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, one of the most infamous days 
of the Apartheid regime, when 69 protesting civilians were killed by the police whilst 
demonstrating against ‘Passbooks’ that Africans were required to carry.3 
                                                          
1Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p.61 
2 Taken from a Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa. No. 50, 2012. (Italics added) 
Staatskoerant, 12 September 2012 No. 35680. Terms of Reference. Marikana is a mining town located in the North 
West Province of South Africa. 
3The event has been compared to similar historical events in South Africa. As Peter Alexander notes: “In the popular 
imagination it is something that has its own recognisable label – there was the Sharpeville Massacre (1961), the 
Soweto Uprising (1976), and now the Marikana Massacre (2012)” See “Marikana, a turning point in South African 
history,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol 40 No. 138 (2013), p. 614 
9 
In line with its status as a commission of inquiry, the Marikana Commission had a specific 
fact-finding mandate: to “inquire into, make findings and report on” the conduct of the 
main actors involved: Lonmin Plc (Lonmin), the South African Police Services (SAPS) and 
other key parties. Moreover, it was required to make recommendations to ensure that a 
“tragedy” of this kind would not happen again.4 The investigation into the conduct of 
these parties was to decipher whether either party “directly or indirectly caused loss of 
life or damage to persons or property”; or whether actions of these parties contributed 
towards the creation of “tension, labour unrest or disunity”,5 and ascertain whether the 
“conduct [of the actors involved] was lawful … reasonable and justifiable in the particular 
circumstances”.6 All these aims are relevant to understanding the Marikana 
Commission’s ‘fact-finding role’. 
The Terms of Reference also presents a characteristic example of a ‘fact-finding’ Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry;7 and it is this ‘fact-finding’ role that reflects the generic mandate 
of commissions of inquiry in general -- as compared to the more distinctive notion of 
‘truth-seeking’. However, the presentation of the Commission to the general public 
suggests quite overtly that it was concerned with more than simply ‘fact-finding’. This is 
evident in the motto adopted, which adorned the commission’s online web page and that 
4At the commencement of the commission other parties investigated included the Association of Mineworkers and 
Construction Union (Amcu) with focus on its members and officials’ conduct; the conduct of the National Union of 
Mineworker (NUM); the Department of Mineral Resources and other related government departments. 
Staatskoerant, 12 September 2012 No. 35680. Terms of Reference. 
5 Ibid.  
6Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa, No. 50, 2012. Staatskoerant, 12 September 2012 No. 
35680 
7 There is often a distinction made between a Judicial Commission of Inquiry and other types of Commissions of 
Inquiry. Whilst the fact that a judge is presiding over the commission may provide an increased air of impartiality 
that is associated with judicial office, legally there is no distinction between the two. See A. Middleton, "Notes on 
the nature and conduct of commissions of inquiry: South Africa." The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa (1986), p. 253 
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was printed on the banners draped up at the Commission’s hearings itself: “Truth, 
Restoration and Justice”.8 Significantly, these terms echo the aims and public discourse 
surrounding the national Truth and Reconciliation process that became a hallmark of 
South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to democracy. The words on the banner suggest 
a more specific ‘truth-seeking’ role for the Marikana Commission. It involves an overt 
recoupling of the complementary notions of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, which in South Africa 
have often gone together in sometimes mutually enforcing, but often contradictory and 
complex ways.9 
A more substantial indication of the wider mandate of the Commission’s work is provided 
by the closing arguments of the Commission’s evidence leader Advocate Geoff Budlender. 
“Chair, we submit the first purpose of the Commission is a truth telling purpose, 
that South Africans and not only South Africans, want to know what happened in 
the terrible week, that terrible week in August 2012 culminating in the killing of 34 
people by members of the SAPS. They want to know what happened and they want 
to know why. The second is an accountability purpose. Those who are responsible 
for what happened must be identified and they must be held to account. The third 
purpose is a healing purpose. Steps have to be taken to heal the terrible wounds 
which were caused by the events of that week. Truth-telling and accountability will 
be part of the process of healing but it will take more than that to achieve the 
healing. And fourthly, there is a purpose of looking forward. Having identified 
what went wrong we need to take effective steps to make sure that this never 
happens again.”10 
8 This motto is printed on the Commission’s logo on the online web page http://www.marikanacomm.org.za/ 
9See André du Toit, "Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, Gandhi and the TRC." Journal 
of Southern African Studies. Vol 31, No. 2 (2005), p. 419-448. 
10Budlender SC. The Marikana Commission of Inquiry. Transcript. Day 294  p. 38494-5 [Emphasis Mine] 
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These four purposes outlined by Budlender: that of truth-telling, accountability, healing 
and forward-looking go far beyond the fact-finding role stipulated in the Commission’s 
Terms of Reference and appear to prioritise ‘truth-telling’ over the ‘fact-finding’ purpose 
of the Commission. Indeed they speak to another range of issues that in popular, 
academic and policy discourse are associated with the role of ‘truth commissions’, and 
particularly, the role of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Truth commissions, however, fall within the field of Transitional Justice.11 The central 
question of transitional justice is how the incumbent civilian and democratic regime 
ought to ‘deal with the conflicts of the past’ in terms of attaining justice for victims of gross 
human rights violations, apportioning responsibility (legal, moral) or criminal 
accountability for harms committed, and to restore trust in a new political order grounded 
on respect for human rights within a liberal democratic framework. It is concerned with 
confronting past political crimes as a component of a “major political transformation”.12 
As Budlender’s last point identifies, the notion of dealing with the past is viewed as a 
necessary step towards avoiding such abuses from reoccurring. Hence the name of the 
report by one of the first ever truth commissions set up (in Argentina) entitled Nunca 
Mas, meaning ‘Never again’.13 Transitional justice initiatives to confront past abuses 
include the development of various options: (retributive) justice [perpetrators should be 
11Transitional Justice can be described as a theoretical and practical academic field that developed as a response to 
the various problems countries in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and different parts of Africa faced 
after experiences of transition from authoritarian rule – in a process referred to term as the ‘Third Wave’ of 
democratisation. See Samuel Huntington, The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century (University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1993) 
12Louis Bickford, “Transitional Justice”, Encyclopaedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2004), Vol 3, p. 
1045 
13 The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) investigated details of citizens who had 




criminally prosecuted and punished, as was the case in the Nuremberg Trials], amnesty 
[perpetrators are officially pardoned or indemnified] or amnesia [past acts of violence 
should be forgotten, as occurred in Spain].14 Transitional justice is not an alternative to  
criminal justice but, to use the words of Alex Boraine, it is “a convenient way of describing 
the search for a just society in the wake of undemocratic, often oppressive and even violent 
systems”.15 The word transitional in this context is also key. It signifies that the “old order 
is dying but that the new order has not yet been born.”16 
In the context of transitional justice the idea and practice of ‘truth-finding’ is thus 
concerned both with the unearthing of knowledge concerning past political crimes and 
violations of human rights abuses; as well as serving as official acknowledgment of those 
abuses to restore dignity to the victims. It is in this sense that the notion of ‘truth-seeking’ 
were raised in the TRC. However, in this instance ‘truth’ was fused with the grand aim of 
national ‘reconciliation’ – not dissimilar to the Marikana Commission’s idea of 
‘restoration’.  
Although there is no overt mention of ‘truth-seeking’ in the Marikana Commission’s 
mandate, it became apparent as the Commission carried out its work that ‘getting to the 
truth’ behind what transpired at Marikana was regarded as a matter of national 
importance. Judge Farlam stated during the Commission’s proceedings, 
                                                          
14See Neil J Kritz, (ed.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 3 Volumes 
(Washington: Us. Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Andrew Rigby. Justice and reconciliation: After the violence. 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) 
15Alexander L. Boraine, "Transitional justice: A holistic interpretation." Journal of International Affairs Vol 60, No. 1 
(2006), p. 18 
16Ibid, p. 17 
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“if ever there was a commission in the history of this country on which the eye of 
history is focused, this is it… It’s vitally important that we do our utmost to get to 
the truth.”17 
But exactly what kind of ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and ‘restoration’ was the Marikana Commission 
attempting to get at? Was it concerned merely with issues of accuracy in ‘fact-finding’ – 
to find out what happened for an official record, for the eventual purpose of apportioning 
legal responsibility to perpetrators (what may be referred to as factual or forensic 
knowledge), or was it concerned with a different version of ‘truth-telling’, more in line 
with the TRC’s victim-centred truth as acknowledgement? 
Critics of the Marikana Commission accuse it of exonerating the police, charging that it 
‘white-washed’ the event, much like the Apartheid-era commissions following the 
Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprisings: the Wessels and Cillié Commissions, 
respectively.18 The ambivalent aims and objectives of the Marikana Commission of 
Inquiry raises important questions concerning the role of official ‘truth-seeking’ 
commissions in democratic South Africa. More especially the Marikana Commission’s 
claims to seek truth for the purpose of justice, accountability and societal healing leads 
one to ask how this institution differs from a Truth Commission, as a Transitional Justice 
mechanism, and specifically the TRC. Moreover, the connection highlights a remarkable 
and problematic feature concerning canonic literature on ‘truth-commissions’, which 
tend to view these within a context of transitional justice only and not in relation to 
Commissions of Inquiry more generally.  
17 Chairperson. The Marikana Commission of Inquiry. Transcript. Day 63, p. 6648 





As a Truth Commission the TRC was conceptualized as an institutional ‘tool’ in the 
transformation of South African society from Apartheid authoritarianism to a democratic 
society. Those identified as victims of gross human rights violations were invited to tell 
their stories of human rights violations and seek official acknowledgement of victims’ 
pain to encourage healing, social reconciliation nation-building. However, the TRC 
combined a strained marriage of a victim-focused truth telling process with a quasi-
judicial, perpetrator-focused amnesty process which, according to Andre du Toit, “made 
for a complex, unstable and in key respects incoherent overall process”.19 With this thesis 
I follow Adam Sitze in challenging the Transitional Justice literature that locates the TRC 
primarily within the recent context of transitions from authoritarian rule and place it 
rather in relation to the colonial and apartheid trajectory of Commissions of Inquiry. 
When Judge Farlam stated “if ever there was a commission in the history of this country 
on which the eye of history is focused, this is it…” he was alluding to the fact that 
Commissions have been used quite ubiquitously in South Africa’s history. Indeed, 
Commissions of Inquiry have a long and somewhat ambiguous history in South Africa as 
official instruments used for ascertaining ‘the truth’ regarding unlawful state killings. 
There are two related, but distinct, points here: First, official commissions of inquiry are 
well-established institutions in South Africa that serves as a relevant context for 
understanding ‘truth commissions’.20 Second, that there is a particular colonial and 
Apartheid tradition of official investigations designed to establish the ‘truth’ about 
                                                          
19André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’." International Journal of Public Theology. Vol. 8, no. 4 (2014), p. 418 
20See also Annie Kok and Elrena van der Spuy, “South African Inquiries into Policing 1910-2015” Centre of 
Criminology, University of Cape Town (2015) 
http://journals.assaf.org.za/sacq/article/view/455/347 
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unlawful state killings – a subtype of commission of inquiry that Adam Sitze has termed 
‘Tumult Commissions’.21   
Moreover, the ambiguities and complexities inherent to the TRC’s process and indeed 
product, appear to have been replicated by the Marikana Commission, its objectives and 
the eventual Report. Typical of the role of official commissions there is a basic disparity 
between its claims to ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-telling’ concerning political violence, and 
the report’s effective legitimization of asymmetrical power relations between state agents, 
as perpetrators, and victims. This assists in explaining some of the confusions in the way 
the TRC understood its own mandate and indeed its incoherence as an official ‘truth-
seeking’ project.  
In relation to the first point, that of the history of commissions of inquiry as a relevant 
context for the ‘truth-seeking’ of the TRC and the Marikana Commission, Adam Ashforth 
analysed the official discourse of twentieth-century commission reports of state inquiries 
into what the ruling order at the time called the ‘Native Question’ (later, questions of ‘race 
relations’).22 Ashforth was concerned with how claims to official knowledge and state 
power are mutually enforcing and draws attention to the many ‘schemes’ used by official 
commissions to legitimate their findings, the commission, and the state that authorised 
it. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 drawing on Foucault’s discourse 
theory and the potential ways in which official ‘truth seeking’ operate within, and in turn 
21 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), p.160 
22 Strangely, in this text Ashforth does not discuss some of the more immediate precursors to the TRC that I mention 
in this thesis, namely the Wessels and Cillié commissions. However there is a list of the Commissions of Inquiry that 
were held in South Africa between 1960 and 1995 in the TRC report of 1998, Volume 1: 498-508. Adam Ashforth, 




can reinforce, certain ‘truth regimes’.23 Necessary to note at this stage is Ashforth’s 
assertion that State Commissions were a defining feature of South African state and 
society formation, particularly in the institutionalisation of racial relations and capital 
control.24 Critically, commission findings typically only ever reformulated, but did not not 
question the dominant state discourse in any fundamental way.25 
Held congruently with the ‘Native Question’ commissions, there was another sub-set of 
commissions of inquiry, which Adam Sitze called ‘Tumult Commissions’. ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ were set up with loose mandates of ‘truth finding’ following mass state 
killings during or following a large insurgency.26 Like the ‘Native Question’ commissions, 
‘Tumult Commissions’ were also concerned with ‘race relations’. A key difference between 
the two sub-types refers to the context precipitating their inception: ‘Native question’ 
commissions were initiated for the purpose of avoiding racial strife27; whereas ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ inquired into race relations after they had already led to violence and 
repression.28 
According to Sitze’, ‘Tumult Commissions’ were regular features of colonial rule and he 
presents the Jamaica Royal Commission (JRC) as the archetypal case. This commission 
                                                          
23Ashforth, Adam. 1990. "Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge 
Forms". Journal of Historical Sociology. Vol 3 No.1 (1990), p.1-22; Michel Foucault, "The subject and power." Critical 
inquiry. Vol 8, no. 4 (1982), p. 777-795. 
24For the better part of the 20th Century South Africa constituted a socio-political system where the black majority 
were relegated to the subaltern strata of society in servitude of the white minority capital interests State inquires 
(like the Native Affairs Commission, Tomlinson etc.) served to provide scientific justification for policies of 
citizenship, labour and movement for the ‘natives’. Hence, for Ashforth, the specific roles of commissions of inquiry 
as tools of governance that would intervene at moments of political crisis. 
25Ibid, p. 1-2 
26 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), p.160 
27United Kingdom. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, p.69 




was established in 1866 to inquire into the violent suppression of the Morant Bay 
rebellion. In the South African context Sitze tallies twenty-four of these ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ that were held after instances where the state’s repression of riots, or public 
disturbances, had led to extra-judicial killings by state agents and prompted the need for 
official inquiry.29 All of them were officially appointed and guided by fairly open-ended 
mandates for ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’ regarding the uses and misuses of security 
forces’ powers, particularly when a state of emergency had been declared. As will be 
explained in more detail in Chapter 2, the official reports of these ‘Tumult Commissions’ 
on state massacres was imbued with what Sitze calls the ‘Discourse of Tragedy’. Whilst 
state officials were legally indemnified from their actions ex ante under Martial Law, or 
Emergency Laws, the tragic discourse excused the use of state violence as an unfortunate 
necessity to enforce law and order. For the purpose of simplicity, it will henceforth be 
referred to as the ‘tragic discourse of official exoneration’. When one returns to the 
language with which the Marikana Massacre is being referred to in official terms of 
reference, the media and the report it too drips with this tragic discourse of exoneration.  
Possessing neither the unbridled freedom of independent inquiries nor the coercive force 
of a court of law, Sitze argues that these Tumult Commissions: 
“could…in principle…give rise to prosecutions, [but] they were more often 
substitutes for prosecutions… Under Apartheid South Africa, the more the 
commissions of inquiry would be created to investigate state massacres, the less 
they would produce public debate and discussion… Here the Commission of 
Inquiry was not a fact-finding device; it was a white washing machine’”.30 
                                                          
29 These include the Bulhoek (1921), Bondelswarts (1923), Witsieshoek (1951), Sharpeville (Wessels, 1960) and 
Soweto (Cillié, 1976) commissions of inquiry. Ibid, p. 160 




The idea of an official commission, mandated to inquire into conflicts of the past, being 
referred to as a ‘whitewash’ implies that rather than objectively uncovering the ‘truth’; 
‘Tumult Commissions’ have functioned to obscure the truth. Interestingly, similar 
accusations have been levied against the TRC. Mahmood Mamdani, for instance, argued 
that the truth produced by the TRC is best understood as an ‘institutionally produced 
truth’ where the boundaries of truth-seeking were narrowly defined by political power 
and aimed at legitimating the power of the incumbent government. In short, Mamdani 
claimed that the TRC “turned the political boundaries of a compromise in to analytical 
boundaries of truth-seeking”.31 Hence, as an official “truth-seeking” commission, the TRC 
can be seen as having produced a compromised truth that obscured the larger truth about 
Apartheid’s violence, its victims, perpetrators and beneficiaries.  
The ‘Marikana Massacre’ did not occur under a colonial regime or Apartheid, but in the 
context of South Africa’s post-Apartheid constitutional democracy. The Marikana 
Commission, too, had broad aims to achieve some measure of ‘truth’, ‘restoration’, and 
‘justice’. In different ways, all these state commissions are official truth projects which 
made claims to ascertaining the ‘truth’ about conflicts of the past. In general this thesis is 
concerned with the problem of how these official truth-seeking projects are related.  How 
(if at all) have these ‘truth-seeking’ commissions informed one another’s 
conceptualizations of truth, their practices of ‘truth-finding’ and the types of truth they 
eventually produce? As South Africa transitioned from Apartheid, through processes of 
liberalisation and eventual democratisation, has there been a similar evolution in the 
‘truth-seeking’ roles of ‘Tumult Commissions’ pointing to an increased commitment by 
                                                          
31 Mahmood Mamdani, "The truth according to the TRC," The Politics of Memory: Truth, healing and social 
justice (2000), p. 177-178 
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government for self-reflection and genuine problem-solving? Or do they still function as 
‘white-washing’ machines telling the official truth the state wishes to legitimate and, in 
the words of Michael Bishop, “attempts to avoid meaningful action?”32 
1.2 Research Questions 
The first main question this thesis will seek to answer is: 
What are the various functions of official, “truth-seeking” commissions of inquiry in 
South Africa, from Sharpeville (1960) to the TRC (1995-2002), to Marikana (2012)? 
Clarifying these various functions exposes some significant ambiguities and 
contradictions in official claims to ‘truth-finding’, particularly with regard to the method 
by which ‘official truth’ is pursued, as well as the implications of an investigative 
commission making findings of accountability or responsibility for unlawful state killings. 
Therefore, the second main question the thesis goes on to ask is:  
What are the main issues associated with official ‘truth-seeking’ when official discourse 
legitimates political violence? 
These questions lead to another key distinction integral to the work of this thesis, aside 
from ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth seeking’ in relation to official commissions of inquiry and 
truth commissions, respectively and introduces the notion of the ‘tragic discourse of 
official exoneration’ that was typical of ‘Tumult Commissions’. 
32 Michael Bishop, “An Accidental Good? The role of Commissions of Inquiry in South African Democracy,” accessed 




1.3 Chapter Outline 
Chapter two, that follows, distinguishes commissions of inquiry from other institutional 
investigatory practices like courts of law or tribunals and expands on the various forms 
that commissions of inquiry take. I draw primarily on Ashforth’s conception of ‘Native 
Question’ commissions, Sitze’s ‘Tumult Commission’ and various canonical accounts of 
‘truth commissions’ by scholars of transitional justice, such as Priscilla Hayner. This sets 
out an analytical scheme that distinguishes between the main functions of commissions 
of inquiry in terms of their ‘fact-finding’, ‘truth seeking’, and narrative functions. At the 
same time, I introduce the Jamaica Royal Commission of 1866 as an archetypal ‘Tumult 
Commission’, and through an analysis of its political context, praxis and findings, as well 
as the consequences of those findings, I flesh out the conceptual scheme introduced.  
Chapter Three analyses the ‘truth-seeking’ of the commission of inquiry set up to 
investigate the facts surrounding the Sharpeville Massacre of 1 March, 1960. Considering 
the Apartheid context, I use the analytical and conceptual framework set up in Chapter 
Two to tease out what Ashforth referred to as the particular ‘legitimating schemes’ used 
by the Commission to serve a particular political agenda. This chapter draws extensively 
from the Wessels Commission report tracing continuities and discontinuities with the 
JRC, and particularly the pragmatic function of the tragic discourse as an official 
discourse of exoneration on political violence. 
Chapter Four analyses the TRC in relation to earlier commissions of inquiry and 
specifically interrogates the extent to which the TRC, as an official truth commission, 
challenged the nature of official ‘truth seeking’ commissions in a way that allowed for a 




remained faithful to Sitze’s ‘Tumult Commission’ tradition that ‘whitewashed’ and 
legitimated apartheid’s violence. I draw extensively from transitional justice scholars as 
well as primary legislation and the TRC Report and first-hand accounts of the TRC 
process by Alex Boraine, Lars Buur and Richard Wilson to trace the stages of the TRC’s 
inner workings. 
Chapter 5 offers a final analysis and conclusions considering the more recent Marikana 
Commission of Inquiry. It interrogates the inherent contradictions in the claims to ‘truth’, 
‘justice’ and ‘restoration’ and problematizes them in relation to the Commission’s official 
status as an investigatory commission, and not a court of law. The conclusion aims to 
highlight residual and persistent dilemmas and ambiguities in the function of ‘Tumult 





Chapter 2: Official truth-seeking after (post-)colonial state 
violence: institutional formats, discursive phases and 
narrative functions -- an analytical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
As Dale Mckinley noted in an article published by the South African Civil Society 
Information Service, South Africa “could arguably be called the Commission Capital of 
the World”.33 At one point in 2014 there were six official commissions running 
simultaneously, of which the Marikana Commission of Inquiry was just one.34 Scholars 
writing on commissions of inquiry in the 1970s such as Chapman, Wraith and Lamb 
tended to take the mandates and stated objectives of commissions of inquiry (typically 
that of objective investigation, impartial fact-finding and official advice) at face value.35 
However, I propose a critical approach. First, while commissions of inquiry may indeed 
share certain generic features and functions, one can distinguish different (sub)-types and 
genres among the variety of commissions of inquiry. Within those types, one can 
differentiate various modes of official ‘truth-seeking’ such as ‘fact-finding’ or the search 
for forensic and/or narrative truths. Through identifying the different modes of official 
‘truth-seeking, one can also investigate the different functions of commissions of inquiry.  
                                                          
33 Dale McKinley, “Commission of Inquiry or Omission?” The South African Civil Society Information Service. April 14, 
2015  
34 There was also the Khayelitsha Commission inquiring into policing and community safety, a presidential 
commission into the Arms Deal, a Ministerial Commission into the harsh evictions that took place in Lwandle, a 
Competition Commission investigation into the private medical industry, and a departmental commission into the 
collapse of a mall in Tongaat KwaZulu-Natal. These also exemplify the vast range of reasons for which commissions 
of inquiry may be set up. Because of this diversity, various ‘sub-types’ of commissions are evident; however, they all 
fall within the general category of ‘commission of inquiry’, ‘official commission’ or ‘state commission’.  
35 See for example R.A Chapman (ed), The Role of Commissions in Policy-Making (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973) and 
R.E Wraith & G. B. Lamb, Public Inquiries as an Instrument of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971). For more 
on the history of Royal Commissions see H.M. Clokie & J.W Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry: The Significance 




This chapter traces the development of official commissions of inquiry used to investigate 
political violence within processes of colonial and post-colonial state formation. The 
characterization of political violence as the object of inquiry in official ‘truth-seeking’ has 
implications. The term ‘state violence’ suggests a concern with the actions of state agents, 
whereas referring to ‘popular insurrections’, ‘insurgencies’ or ‘protests’ includes the 
agency of non-state agents, indicating a broader scope of official truth-seeking. I use the 
term ‘political violence’ in a broad sense to include political violence committed at the 
hands of the state and the violence caused by civil insurrection. 
Section 2.2 locates commissions of inquiry in historical perspective and draws on 
institutional formats to highlight some traditional uses and the diachronic evolution of 
usage. Section 2.3 probes key accounts in the Transitional Justice literature on truth 
commissions and identifies some of the limitations of prevailing analyses, specifically in 
the work of oft-cited specialist Priscilla Hayner,36 and considers the discursive functions 
of official commissions with special reference to Ashforth’s notion of “schemes of 
legitimation”.37 This prepares the way for a discussion of the legitimating functions of the 
official discourse of Commissions of Inquiry and their associated narrative genres in 
section 2.4 with special reference to the tragic discourse associated with ‘tumult 
commissions’. Finally 2.4 also provides a case study of the Jamaica Royal Commission as 
an archetypal ‘tumult commission’ as well as its associated ‘tragic discourse’.  
                                                          
36To date Hayner has written many books and articles on the subject of truth commissions. I draw primarily on 
Priscilla B Hayner, "Fifteen truth commissions-1974 to 1994: a comparative study." Human Rights Quarterly. Vol 16 
No 4 (1994) pp.597-655; Priscilla B Hayner, Unspeakable truths: transitional justice and the challenge of truth 
commissions (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2011) 
37 Adam Ashforth, "Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge 




At the same time this chapter sets out to clarify the analytical distinctions between three 
central conceptual schemes:  
(1) objective fact-finding, relating to the basic mandate of generic commissions of 
inquiry;  
(2) official truth-seeking, as a distinctive claim made by official investigations into 
state violence (such as ‘tumult commissions’ and ‘truth commissions’) and 
(3) the narrative function of official inquiries as a genre of discursive practice, 
differentiating between ‘forensic discourses’, ‘tragic discourses’ and ‘truth 
discourses’ in legitimating or justifying particular  instances of state violence. 
The framework rests on two crucial assumptions: that discourse forms a system of 
meaning constituting particular understandings of political life; and that narrative takes 
specific discursive forms, where identifying certain narrative features renders the more 
general claims about political discourse analysis more context-specific. 
2.2. Historical and Analytical Perspectives  
2.2.1 Commissions of Inquiry in Historical Perspective 
As this thesis’s focus is on commissions of inquiry set up after the state has used excessive 
force to quell a riot or an uprising, a deeper understanding of their legitimating function, 
in (re)producing state authority, requires some historical overview. Particularly, in the 
case of tumult commissions, this involves questions relating to the justificatory functions 
of commissions and the discursive legitimation of violence enacted by the state to restore 




from the regular exercise of legislative and administrative powers -- in official responses 
to breakdowns in maintaining order?  
Commissions of Inquiry have featured in English law and governance dating back to the 
12th century. In medieval England they were variously used as tribunals, to determine 
legal guilt or innocence, or as investigative instruments when treason or sedition was 
suspected, or to prosecute those who posed a threat to the Monarchy.38 As Sir John 
Fortescue, the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, wrote in the 15th century, “the King shall 
often send his commissioners in great force…to repress and punish rioters and risers”.39 
However, the adjudicative and retributive functions of official commissions dissipated as 
did the legitimacy of arbitrary monarchical rule.  
With the emergence of modern ‘governance’ during the Enlightenment era, commissions 
of inquiry became official instruments that sought to manage natural and social 
phenomena by addressing particular problems of how best to serve the population’s 
welfare and safety.40 Following Foucault, Sitze locates these procedures in the context of 
the increasing prominence of commission of inquiries’ ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’ 
roles in the development of specific methodologies of investigation. 
“It aimed at knowledge of proximate, immediate and efficient causes [of the 
problem under investigation] as determined by instrumental reason, their 
                                                          
38 See Clokie and Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry, p. 54–79. 
39John Fortescue, On the Laws and Governance of England, ed. Shelley Lockwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p 98. 
40 Simply put, modern governance was no longer primarily concerned with defending territory, but with particular 
administrative functions that governing social life. Foucault calls this a process of ‘governmentalisation’, where 
mechanisms of governance refer to both the discursive practices (discourse) and non-discursive practices, like 
institutions and policy that have informed state formation in mutually enforcing ways. See Foucault, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (London: Tavistock, 1972); Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New 
York: Random House, 1973); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); “The 




necessary and sufficient conditions, and dependent and independent variables, as 
determined by the natural and social sciences (statistics chief among them).”41  
Sitze’s use of the terms ‘sufficient conditions’ and ‘dependent and independent variables’ 
associates the procedures of commissions of inquiry with the emergent modes of 
academic inquiry into social matters, i.e. positivism. Within this paradigm ‘objective 
truth’ became measured by the reliability of the method being utilised.  
2.2.2 Institutional formats: generic aspects, institutional and thematic sub-
types 
From an analytical perspective commissions of inquiry need to be distinguished from 
other institutionalised investigatory practices such as courts of law, tribunals or practises 
like investigative journalism. We may also distinguish different institutional and thematic 
sub-types, like Judicial and Historical Commissions, which share the generic features of 
Commissions of Inquiry. Different types of investigative bodies have different goals, 
methodologies and specific criteria as to what constitutes ‘truth’ in relation to their 
mandated aims even if they in various ways share the basic objective of “fact-finding”. For 
example, domestic and international criminal trials rely on legal approaches, or forensic 
argumentation, to determine the lawful culpability of the alleged perpetrators regarding 
specified crimes for purposes of sanction or punishment by due process.42 Hence, judicial 
                                                          
41 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, p. 136 
42 Elster provides a succinct account of the principles of due process, “Adversarial and public hearings; the right to 
choose one’s own lawyer; the right to appeal; no retroactive legislation or retroactive application of the law; respect 
for the status of limitations; determination of individual guilt; a presumption of innocence that places the burden of 
proof on the prosecution; the right to a speedy hearing (justice delayed is justice denied); and the right to due 
deliberation (justice expedited is also justice denied).”Jon Elster, Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical 




‘truth’ in the context of a criminal trial is determined on the basis of the legally admissible 
facts of the case. In civil proceedings it is based on the balance of probabilities.43 
Whilst accommodating the various degrees of proof necessary to suit different types of 
cases, only specific types of ‘truth-telling’ are allowed to take place in a court of law. 
Within the adversarial trial, ‘truth’ is legally framed while the content of testimony must 
be reconfigured into legal terminology. Robert Van Krieken argues that within the court 
of law:  
“There are no extra‐legal ‘truths’ exempted from the juridical gaze and cross‐
examination, no facts which have any autonomous status, all knowledge is mere 
testimony in favour of one party or another. All science is merely ‘opinion’, the 
reliability of any area of knowledge is always open to the court’s critical scrutiny.”44 
Hence the process by which ‘truth’ is scrutinised according to legally admissible facts 
informs a particular form of ‘fact-finding’ in the context of the adversarial trial in a court 
of law or tribunal. As stated in Spencer v Randal, the “outcome of a lawsuit”, which is the 
vindication of legal rights,   
“depends more often on how the fact-finder appraises the facts than on a disputed 
construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the 
                                                          
43Denning LJ in Bater v Bater is worth citing with reference to degrees of proof: “It is of course true that by our law 
a higher standard of proof is required in criminal cases than in civil cases. But this is subject to the qualification that 
there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. The degree that is required depends on the subject-matter. 
A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher degree of probability than 
that which it would require when asking if negligence is established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal 
court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require a degree of probability which 
is commensurate with the occasion.” Cited in Jan Hendrik de la Rey, The Fact-Finding Process and the Burden of Proof 
during Litigation. Thesis. (University of Pretoria, 2007) p. 96 [Emphasis Mine] 
44 Robert Van Krieken, “Legal Reasoning as a Field of Knowledge Production: Luhmann, Bourdieu, and Law’s 
Autonomy” (paper presented at the Law, Power & Injustice: Confronting the Legacies of Socio-legal Research, Law 
& Society Association Conference, Chicago, 2004) cited in Kate Leader,“Bound and Gagged: The Performance of 




procedure by which the facts of the case are determined assume an importance 
fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.”45 
When viewed as a narrative genre, it may be termed a forensic discourse. 
Judicial inquiries can be differentiated from Historical Commissions, which may or may 
not be official ‘truth’-seeking commissions.  As its name suggests, a Historical 
Commission focuses on especially significant past events that have impacted on particular 
groups of people, typically a racial or ethnic group. The significance of a Historical 
Commission, as distinct from general historical research, is that its findings will have the 
higher status of ‘official’ truths, especially when set up by the State. The task of a Historical 
Commission goes beyond merely ‘fact-finding’, by locating its investigations within an 
interpretive framework appropriate to the purpose for which it was established.  
For example, various Historical Commissions were set up across Europe after the Jewish 
Holocaust by the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in Germany.46 Initially these 
Historical Commissions were not officially authorised but enabled Jewish people to write 
history from a communal perspective.47 The processes may be viewed as allowing victims 
and survivors to speak ‘truth to power’48 against former oppressors and to publicise the 
                                                          
45 Spencer v Randall 357 US 513 cited in de la Rey, The Fact-Finding Process and the Burden of Proof, p. 3 
46These Commissions had two aims: first, to amass German anti-Semitic literature, documents and all forms of 
evidence concerning the details of the Nazi extermination machine. Second, it was to collect survivors' stories, works 
of art, poetry, literature and Jewish folklore in order to reclaim the Jewish legacy that the Nazi regime had attempted 
to destroy. See David Bankier and Dan Mikhman, Holocaust Historiography in Context: Emergence, challenges, 
polemics and achievements (Berghahn Books, 2008) 
47Ibid. 
48The phrase "speak truth to power" originates in the 1955 book,” Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an 
Alternative to Violence,” published by the American Friends Service Committee. It commonly refers to harnessing 
the power of the people to stand up to authority and has particular resonances in movements advocating non-
violent approaches to political and social change. American Friends Service Committee, Speak truth to power: a 




brutality faced within concentration camps across Eastern Europe.49 Compared to the 
forensic discourse of tribunals, these Historical Commissions also engaged in ‘fact-
finding’ but framed evidence in a narrative of remembrance, commemoration and 
triumph over adversity for Jewish people. Eventually these various commissions’ findings 
were incorporated into Yad Vashem, Israel’s official memorial of Holocaust victims and 
survivors, constituting a public acknowledgement of the ‘truths’ of the Jewish experience 
of modern anti-Semitism in Europe. The official status of the findings thus allowed not 
only a space in which victims could speak truth to power, but also a way in which they 
could speak truth with power – truth officially sanctioned.  
A national truth commission’s mandate is usually broader than both a court of law and an 
historical commission. Its final report typically includes both individual narratives of 
gross human rights violation as well as more general analyses of the types and character 
of such abuses that have defined a period of gross human rights abuses in a country’s 
history, though typically a truth commission does not seek to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators of human rights abuses.50 Like historical commissions, truth commissions 
collect witness testimonies (which include but are not limited to the testimony of victims); 
they can hold hearings in public, and they generally incorporate evidence from various 
other sources to aid in developing an overall picture of a period of human rights abuses 
                                                          
49 In calling for submissions the Historical Commission instructed victims and survivors ‘Write down your martyrology 
and submit it to us... Remember where and in whose keeping you saw the material; and give us the address... We 
call to all those who are interested that this dark period in our history receive appropriate illumination and the 
memory of our martyrs not be lost." Cited in Bankier and Mikhman, Holocaust Historiography in Context, p. 109 
50 See Tristan Anne Borer, Telling the truths: truth telling and peace building in post-conflict societies (Notre Dame, 
Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball, “Levels of Truth: Macro Truth and the 
TRC” in Chapman and Van der Merwe (Eds.) Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (University 




that occurred within a state during a period of conflict.51 This highlights their function in 
providing knowledge of gross human rights abuses in a country during a specified period. 
However, for the specific purpose of official truth commissions victim and other 
testimonies also function to establish truth as acknowledgement. The distinction 
between truth as knowledge and truth as acknowledgment was made by American 
philosopher Thomas Nagel, in response to the question: what is the reason for official 
public hearings and reports concerning cases where the facts of past crimes and the 
identity of the ‘torturers’ are known to the public, and when the torturers are aware that 
the public know who they are? For Nagel the answer lies in the distinction between 
knowledge and acknowledgment. 
“[Acknowledgement] is what happens and can only happen to knowledge when it 
becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public cognitive scene”.52 
Within the generic form of commissions of inquiry other institutional formats of inquiry 
may be identified, e.g. Judicial Commissions - like the Farlam Commission introduced in 
chapter one. Commissions of inquiry may also be considered according to thematic 
subtypes such as Ashforth’s ‘Grand Tradition’ of inquiries into the ‘Native Question’, 
Sitze’s ‘tumult commission’, or the ‘truth commission’ model.53 Curiously the transitional 
justice literature typically fails to consider ‘truth commissions’ as a thematic subtype 
                                                          
51 For Hayner, truth commissions assist in producing a “global truth” of the “broad patterns of events” to confirm 
that atrocities took place and identify the forces that were responsible. She further states, “If [a commission] is 
careful and creative, it can also go far beyond simply outlining the facts of abuse, and contribute to a much broader 
understanding of how people and the country as a whole were affected, and what factors contributed to the 
violence”.Unspeakable Truths, p.84 
52 Thomas Nagel cited in Kritz, Transitional Justice, Vol 1, p. 492 
53Of course, there are other thematic sub-types that may include examples like the State inquiry into allegations of 
procurement fraud and corruption (The Arms Deal) or the commissions of inquiry into policing in the Cape Town 




within this conceptual field of commissions of inquiry. In fact, transitional justice 
literature largely fails to acknowledge the historical antecedents of ‘truth commissions’ as 
a sub-type of commissions of inquiry into political violence. Locating ‘truth commissions’ 
in this context will assist in raising critical questions regarding their uses, and the 
implications of these in understanding their political and discursive functions as tools of 
state legitimation.54 The following section begins to explore some of the implications of 
considering ‘truth commissions’ as a thematic sub-type of commissions of inquiry. 
2.2.3 Official Truth-seeking and ‘Truth Commissions’. 
Along with the emergence of transitional justice in recent decades as a distinctive practice 
and field of investigation the novel institution of truth commissions has become virtually 
synonymous with official truth-seeking in the wake of state violence.  However, it should 
be noted that such truth-seeking need not take the form of an official commission of 
inquiry. Louis Bickford has documented various types of “Unofficial Truth Projects” 
(UTPs) which are likewise geared towards uncovering the ‘truth’ concerning human rights 
abuses committed during a former period, sometimes as part of a broader strategy of 
attaining a measure of accountability and justice.55 These UTPs, intentionally or not, 
mimic the methodologies and serve similar functions to official truth commissions. 
Bickford asserts that their official or unofficial status adds no substantive level of 
superiority to the ‘truth recovery’ process.56 He suggests that the ‘official’ discourse of a 
                                                          
54Ashforth, "Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation", p. 2 
55 These may be initiated by civil society organizations, like religious organisations, and can be highly effective in 
terms of uncovering the truth and having far-reaching public interest in contexts where there does not seem to be 
a plan to institute an official truth commission. UTPs have been effective replacements for official truth commissions 
in Brazil (Nunca Mais, 1984) and Uruguay (Servicio Paz y Justicia, 1985), in Guatemala’s Recovery of Historical 
Memory project led by the Catholic Church, or Northern Ireland (1998), cited in Louise Bickford. “Unofficial Truth 
Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol no,  (2007) p. 994, 1004  




truth commission means, at a minimum, that it has the power to declare it is operating in 
the realm of “official history” (although whether its findings do actually constitute the 
‘official truth’ remains contested).57 
However, the matter is more complex. As noted in the previous section, the question is 
not only that of establishing factual truths (hence gaining additional knowledge of what 
happened), but also a matter of finding the appropriate ways to acknowledge the past.58 
The distinction between knowledge and acknowledgement is important as it indicates two 
different senses of “truth” – truth in a factual sense, which is concerned with a forensic 
process of truth finding, and truth as acknowledgement, which may be understood as 
official recognition of the experience of victims.  
More specifically, we may consider the functions and objectives of truth commissions. In 
her seminal work, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study” 
Priscilla Hayner described the ‘typical structure’ of a truth commission. This is the 
definition that is most cited across transitional justice literature centred on truth 
commissions.  
1) “That a truth commission focuses on the past.  
2) That it is not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of 
certain human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law, over a 
period of time.  
3) That it usually exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist 
with the submission of the report of its findings.  
                                                          
57 Louis Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," Human Rights Quarterly: a Comparative and International Journal of 
the Social Sciences, Philosophy, and Law, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2007), p. 994-1035. For additional reading on contested 
official history and the work of truth commissions see Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (Eds.) Commissioning the 
Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002). 




4) That it is always vested with some sort of authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it 
greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, 
and a greater impact with its report.”59 
This is evidently an inadequate characterization.  At a minimum ‘the past’ would need to 
be amplified to ‘past political violence’ or ‘gross human rights abuses’. As Mark Freeman 
noted, truth commissions are indeed concerned with past rather than ongoing or future 
events, but typically tend to focus on acts of violence occurring “during recent periods of 
abusive rule or armed conflict”.60 Moreover, truth commissions can focus on ongoing as 
well as past violence.61 Another unclear formulation is Hayner’s assertion that truth 
commissions are invested with “some sort of authority”. This relates to the distinction 
between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial truth-seeking’; however Hayner’s requirement of ‘some 
sort of authority’ does not take Bickford’s ‘unofficial truth processes’ into account. 
Hence, while Hayner’s definition may serve as a starting point, it omits some essential 
characteristics of truth commissions. Her first omission is that truth commissions are, 
first and foremost, a particular species of commissions of inquiry. Hayner fails to take 
into account the significant connection between Commonwealth Commissions of Inquiry 
and Truth Commissions. As Mark Freeman has pointed out, "she does not trace the 
important connection between the Commonwealth model and the design and subsequent 
global influence of the South African TRC”.62 The Commonwealth Commission of Inquiry 
model (also called ‘tribunals of inquiry’) originated in the United Kingdom. Underpinned 
                                                          
59 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions”, p. 604 (italics added). Hayner offered other adapted versions in various 
texts. See Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, p. 14 
60Mark Freeman, Truth commissions and procedural fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 15 
61 For instance, a truth commission was set up in the DRC despite the fact the country remained fraught with political 
violence. Freeman, Truth Commission and Procedural Fairness, p. 15 




by the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act (1921) they were authorised to inquire into acts 
of public mischief or controversial issues within Britain but also in its colonial domains.63 
I find Freeman’s definition the most appropriate to my analysis of ‘truth-seeking’ 
commissions of inquiry set up after state-sanctioned human rights abuses. Freeman 
affirms Sitze’s suggestion that truth commissions should be understood in relation to the 
long established practice in British Colonies and the Commonwealth to establish ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ to inquire into past official violence.64 The definition that Freeman offers 
is as follows:  
“A truth commission is an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centred commission of 
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purpose of (1) 
investigating and reporting on the principle causes and consequences of broad and 
relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state 
during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making 
recommendations for their redress and future prevention.”65 
Although Hayner does note that truth commissions exist “temporarily”, Freeman’s 
definition of them as “an ad hoc, autonomous and victim-centred commission of inquiry” 
situates truth commissions within a subtype of commission of inquiry, which he names 
‘Ad hoc national human rights-related commissions of inquiry’.66 This thesis is concerned 
with both ‘event-specific’ commissions and truth commissions.  
                                                          
63“Report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, (Cmnd 3121 London, 1966). Before the promulgation of 
commission of inquiry legislation in the UK, most investigations of public mischief were conducted through Select 
Committees of Parliament. The Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 (UK) – recently repealed by the Inquiries Act, 
2005 (UK) – was passed with the aim of removing the political or partisan elements of public inquiries on 
controversial events and issues. Blom-Cooper, “Public Inquiries” Current Legal Problems, Vol. 46, p.204, (1993) at 
206. cited in Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, p. 22 fn 74 
64 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, p. 130-157 
65 Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, p. xiii. [emphasis mine]  
66 He also identifies four other types of similar inquiries: “event-specific [that investigate a particular event i.e. police 




Another important point relevant to official truth-seeking is that Truth Commissions are 
“set up in and authorized by a state”, and moreover, will inquire into “violations that took 
place within the sponsoring state”.67 This holds irrespective of whether the violations 
were committed predominantly by the state, by non-state actors, or even by a foreign 
occupying force. If country x appoints a commission investigating violations that took 
place in country y, then it is not a truth commission.68 As Freeman argues, truth 
commissions must entail some form of self-reflection by the sponsoring state in an 
attempt to self-investigate and repair in some way.69 Elster makes a similar point in 
relation to transitional justice processes, when he asserts that "in cases of transitional 
justice, the society is in a real sense judging itself."70 
This section clarified various institutional formats used for official ‘truth-seeking’. The 
implication is that different formats also conceptualise ‘truth’ differently, and hence rely 
on appropriate methodologies to pursue that ‘truth’, i.e. a court of law seeks objective facts 
relevant to the case following procedures in line with due process, whereas Historical 
Commissions will accept personal narratives to redefine a period of socio-historical 
significance as official history. However, common to all formats is the general objective 
of, and claim to, ‘official truth-seeking’. This would seem to suggest that we can 
differentiate between various discourses with respect to ‘official truth’ as a particular 
                                                          
a group], socio-historical [investigating a significant period of a country’s history], and institutional [that report on 
events particular to an institution i.e. an inquiry into racism in the police force]”., Ibid, p. 53-58 [Emphasis Freeman’s] 
67 Ibid, p.15 
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domain, but that within that there will be different discursive domains. The following 
section unpacks the political significance and function of ‘official discourse on truth’. This 
requires looking at the relationship between the discursive functions of commissions of 
inquiry and the problem of legitimation.  
2.3 Discursive functions of Commissions of Inquiry 
2.3.1 The legitimating function of Official Discourse and the Problem of 
Legitimation 
The relevant notion of discourse as it pertains to this thesis needs to be carefully 
articulated. It connotes a relatively comprehensive and “systematically articulated 
ensemble of specific ways and modes of talking about particular areas of social life 
associated either with certain general institutions, professions and disciplines or with 
certain general ideological and political positions”.71 Hence I do not use the term to refer 
to a form of linguistic communication; but rather in the same way that one may 
colloquially refer to a ‘legal discourse’, a ‘medical discourse’, a ‘feminist discourse’ or a 
‘colonial discourse’. It is also important to note that discourses imply a certain social 
practice, or the social enactment that in turn generates particular discursive domains.72 
With this in mind, the process of official truth-seeking may be understood to generate its 
own discursive domain – an official discourse on ‘truth’. However, as there are several 
different formats and practises of official truth-seeking, it suggests the existence of 
distinct discourses on truth.  
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This thesis assesses the function of official commissions inquiring into political violence, 
more specifically the ways in which the notion of ‘official truth’ is intrinsically linked to 
the function of legitimating state power. Legitimacy is itself a mercurial concept used in 
various contexts and indeed, discourses. ‘Legitimation’ may be described as a process by 
which an act, a practise, discourse or ideology becomes recognised as having normative 
authority in accordance with particular social norms or values, and has been used to refer 
to legitimate power or authority.73 Writing about the problem of ‘legitimacy-speak’ in 
international law, Crawford states that it “has been applied as a loose substitute for 
legality” and he makes a distinction between that which is lawful and that which is 
legitimate.74 According to Crawford, whilst fidelity to law is assessed by external criteria; 
the language of legitimacy is “necessarily based on particular values and on unilateral or 
partial appreciations”.75 The problem of legitimation then, is that there are no external 
constraints, except those “imposed by the situations in which action is to be taken, power 
employed, or military force used”.76 
Although he was explaining the concept of legitimacy in international law, Crawford’s key 
point is relevant as he makes reference to how one might judge, or speak about an act or 
practise as legitimate, or not.77 Hence, when violence is described or posited as legitimate 
or illegitimate within an ‘official discourse’ I shall refer to this as an official discourse of 
legitimation. The official discourse of legitimation is relevant to understanding Sitze’s 
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notion of the ‘tragic discourse’, which will be explicated below. In the context of ‘Tumult 
Commissions’, it shall be explained how the ‘tragic discourse,’ as used in official 
commissions, operates to justify the actions of security forces in suppressing the rebellion 
and whitewash the violence as necessary to restore law and order.  
2.3.2 Commissions of Inquiry as Schemes of Legitimation (Ashforth) 
The previous sub-section described the historical emergence of Commissions of Inquiry 
as instruments of modern governance. The question remains as to what their specific uses 
and function were as instruments of governance? To answer this question I turn to 
Ashforth’s account of the uses of commissions of inquiry in the South African colonial and 
post-colonial context. Not only did Ashforth deal with a particular sub-type of 
commission of inquiry, but he also focused specifically on their legitimating function in 
terms of the notion of ‘schemes of legitimation’.  
In The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa (1990) Adam 
Ashforth analysed the functions of Commissions of Inquiry in managing the ‘Native 
question’ as a central problem facing South African postcolonial administrations in the 
early 20th century: how to continue using black South African labour in the economy 
without having to incorporate black South Africans into the political and social life of 
white South African society by extending full citizenship rights.78 In addition to their ‘fact-
finding’ role Ashforth highlighted the narrative function of official commissions, 
positioning them as instruments for generating “official discourse” on a particular issue. 
His theoretical case study on commissions of inquiry in South Africa included the Cape 
Native Laws and Customs Commission (1883); the South African Native Affairs 
                                                          




Commission (SANAC) of 1903–1905 and the Native Economic Commission (NEC) of 
1930-1932. These commissions constituted what he termed a ’Grand Tradition’ of 
inquiries into the ‘Native question’ (later known as questions of ‘race relations’) in South 
Africa.79 In contradistinction to other official commissions, the six commissions Ashforth 
studied were unique in that they proposed comprehensive strategies to develop and 
consolidate state power when there were periods of political or social crisis related to the 
‘native question’.80 
Ashforth’s book is useful as he explains the way in which ‘official discourse’ on the ‘native 
question’ presented an authoritative way in which one could speak about social life and, 
hence, organise political subjection.81 He argued that the ‘Native Question’ was 
exacerbated at crucial moments in early 20th century history, resulting from challenges to 
the underlying assumptions regarding the state-capital relationship, and the way in which 
the state could speak for, and to, black South Africans. The state’s primary means of 
addressing this problem was via appointing a special commission of inquiry, whose 
“schemes of legitimation” (comprised of discursive and non-discursive techniques) 
generated new rationales for state power, creating the logic that supported policies of 
racial segregation and separate development.82 
                                                          
79 Ibid, p.5 
80 Stephen Ellingson, "The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa. Adam Ashforth." (1991), 
p. 566 
81Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation”, p. 17 
82 He asserts that commissions of inquiry generated “discursive strategies”, which form “schemes of legitimation”, 
where these Commissions became symbolic exercises of colonial power. For Ashforth, schemes of legitimation are 
different from doctrines or ideologies concerning the political path to the good life; instead they “involve the 
articulation of concrete plans of action to achieve the ‘proper’…means and objectives of power” Ashforth, The 




A practical example of Ashforth’s ‘schemes of legitimation’ in the functioning of 
commissions of inquiry is the role of ‘expert’ anthropologists and economists in the NEC, 
where ‘scientific’ understandings differentiating ‘Natives’ and ‘Europeans’ were 
developed based on their testimony. The NEC Report thus speaks in the language of 
economics – ostensibly justifying principles of differentiation based on the theoretical 
implications of economies being in contact at different stages of development.83 
The ‘native question’ commissions did not make specific ‘truth-seeking’ claims, but rather 
presented ‘scientific’ facts concerning the ‘native question’. This distinguished their role 
as official ‘fact-finding commissions’, from an official ‘truth-seeking’ commission. 
However, Ashforth’s notion of schemes of legitimation is useful in understanding the 
work commissions do in constructing, both deliberately and inadvertently, a framework 
within which discussion of particular issues proceeds -- setting the official terms of 
reference for debate. Specifically, ‘native question’ commissions incorporated the official 
discourse of ‘truth as objectivity’ to legitimate and justify policies of segregation and 
‘separate development’ in colonial and post-colonial Apartheid South Africa. The 
following section shall explain how the process of official discourse formation in the work 
of commissions of inquiry contributed to their legitimating role.  
2.3.3 The Legitimating Functions of the Phases of Discourse in Official Truth-
seeking 
The official discourse of commissions of inquiry requires a public setting and process. In 
principle, private researchers could have devised solutions to the ‘native question’, after 
                                                          




which findings could be publicised to inform further policy. But that would not have the 
authoritative standing and effect of a commission of inquiry. This highlights that the 
official discourse of commissions entails more than simply fact-finding; it also serves a 
narrative function, adding to their potency as political tools of legitimation. More 
specifically, Ashforth differentiates three distinct discursive phases in the structured 
political discourse involved in a Commission of Inquiry’s work of establishing ‘schemes 
of legitimation’. He terms these discursive phases respectively the ‘investigative’, the 
‘persuasive’ and the ‘archival’ processes involved in official discourse.84 These phases 
encompass a totalising approach to ‘the problem’ and its solution, with each phase having 
a particular legitimating function beyond that of ‘fact-finding’, and contributing to a 
commission’s findings  being represented as ‘truths’.  
The investigative phase typically involves the hearing of testimony from civil society. At 
this first and earliest stage of its proceedings state commissions engage directly with the 
public, be that with representatives from civil society, experts etc. From a scientific, or 
Rankean, perspective oral testimony is an inherently unreliable source of objective truth 
due to the fallibility of human memory.85 This begs the question as to why an institution 
mandated to engage in objective fact-finding would make such extensive use of testimony 
to inform its findings. For Ashforth, a commission’s public engagement with civil society 
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contributes to the performance of the commission and functions to present the state as 
responsive to the needs of society.86 It is part of a performance of a ritual.87 
For similar reasons commissions, although not courts of law, typically strive to follow 
quasi-legal procedures that mimic legal processes of forensic inquiry. This highlights the 
highly contingent relationship between the process and the product of official truth-
seeking inquiries, with the ostensibly rational, impartial and scientific procedures of 
‘truth-seeking’ serving to provide a certain authority to the findings.  
The publishing of the official report entails another ‘discursive phase’, which Ashforth 
terms the ‘persuasive’ phase of official discourse: when the report is published as the 
official version of truth.88 This ‘persuasive’ phase of official discourse has less to do with 
objective facts than with expressing what Ashforth refers to as the “truth of power”.89 
When talking about the ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions, Ashforth found that the main 
‘Truth’ conveyed to the public was a legitimating idea – an idea of the State serving the 
interests of society by listening to them and serving their interests. The ‘archival’ phase of 
official commissions is the final phase when findings are archived as the official ‘truth’ of 
that which was under investigation.90 
                                                          
86 Ashforth, ‘Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation”, p.9 
87Hence, engaging in forensic fact-finding through collecting evidence and by hearing testimony forms an integral 
aspect of the ritualistic performance of the commission as a “theatre of power” and contributes to the ultimate 
legitimation of the Commission itself, Ibid. p. 9-15 
88 Ibid, p. 16 
89 For Ashforth, the ‘truth of power’ is that “State power serves the interests of all citizens and is open to their views”. 
On a symbolic level the appointment of the commission of inquiry is a performance of the government paying 
“homage to this truth and serves notice of its desire to serve the common interest in the most rational way”. Ibid, 
p. 12 
90 Compared to Bickford’s distinction between official and unofficial truth projects, Ashforth’s notion of the “truth 
of power” is different from the notion of speaking truth with power. Whilst the former corresponds with the 
persuasive phase, the latter is related to the final discursive phase, which Ashforth terms the ‘archival’ phase of 
official commissions when findings are archived as the official ‘truth’ of that which was under investigation. Objective 




Despite its claims to ‘fact-finding’, Ashforth further argues that official commissions are 
purposefully self-limiting. He describes commission reports as representing the state 
speaking the “truth” about itself; a “truth” which frequently reveals the limits of the 
possible within a particular structure of state”.91 Paul Gready notes that Ashforth’s 
contribution may be compared to Foucault’s understanding of the “institutional 
production of truth and power”92: 
“Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types 
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as truth; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as truth”.93 
In this context Foucault’s notion of a ‘regime of truth’ may serve as an heuristic 
complementing Ashforth’s account of the pragmatic functions of discursive practices in 
legitimating an official Commission’s ‘truth-finding’ process, its final product, and the 
authority of the state that initiated it. Official commissions’ ability to represent ‘the truth’ 
serve to structure the parameters of political debate and action, or what Foucault called a 
‘regime of truth’. 
The notion of ‘regimes of truth’ lends itself to an understanding of ‘truth’ as a discursive 
genre in which various discourses may co-exist as discursive practises, as distinct from 
an idea of ’truth’ as ‘fact’, or ’objective truth’”. Understanding these ‘uses’ of Commissions 
of Inquiry as ‘schemes of legitimation’ suggests that ‘objective’ knowledge may itself form 
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a ‘regime of truth’ within a particular rational and moral community. It also opens up 
another realm of various authoritative claims to ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’, which 
points directly to the narrative function of official commissions. 
2.4 Truth-seeking Commissions of Inquiry and their associated 
Narrative Genres 
This section brings us to the particular focus of the thesis in tracing the ‘truth-seeking’ 
role of official commissions of inquiry set up in the wake of state-sanctioned violence and 
especially of their legitimating or ‘white-washing’ functions when charged with holding 
state agents accountable. This will be discussed with reference to the thematic sub-type 
of ‘Tumult commissions’ and the associated narrative genre of a ‘tragic’ official discourse. 
As a case study of a ‘tumult commission’ the archetypal Jamaican Royal Commission 
(JRC) following the Morant Bay Rebellion (1865) is investigated. 
2.4.1 ‘Tumult Commissions’ and Tragic Discourse 
The notion of ‘Tumult commissions’ as a thematic sub-type of commission of inquiry was 
introduced by Adam Sitze94 and  may serve to highlight the ambiguities surrounding the 
function of the Farlam Commission following the recent incidence of the Marikana 
massacre of 2012. Unlike Ashforth’s ‘Native Question’ Commissions, set up to gather 
scientific facts on a particular (administrative) issue or problem, ‘tumult commissions’ 
are distinctive in that they are set up when the state has been a prime agent in the killing 
of civilians who challenged the oppressive, ‘unjust’ structure of colonial rule in moments 
of collective struggle. This adds a significant dimension to the retrospective ‘truth-
                                                          




seeking’ role of ‘tumult commissions’, as they operate within a discursive scheme where 
notions of ‘truth’ become implicated with allocation of responsibility for the perpetrators 
of political violence. In this connection, we need to consider the legitimating functions 
between ‘truth’ and ‘responsibility’ of the particular narrative structure of ‘official 
discourse’. This is done by applying Ashforth’s understanding of official commissions 
employing ‘schemes of legitimation’. The primary question here is how did ‘tumult 
commissions’ function as a mechanism to establish the official truth concerning state 
massacres? Especially, when typically construed, in the narratives of official reports, as a 
tragedy of unavoidable state actions?95 
Hayden White argues that narrative “entails ontological and epistemic choices with 
distinct ideological and even specifically political implications”.96 The effect is that the 
narrative ’choices’ construct an ‘illusory coherence’ upon narrated events, which supports 
claims to a “secured knowledge of reality”.97 Narrative representations and their claim on 
reality is embedded within narrative structure itself, which tends to situate agents within 
a particular socio-political order, and directs actions towards an end-point fashioning an 
overall ‘meaning’, or ‘closure’ to events; where the ‘closure’ in fact represents a 
constructed transition “from one physical or social space to another”.98 
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Sitze’s notion of the discourse of tragedy, or what I call the ‘tragic discourse of official 
exoneration’, may be taken as an instance of this.The narrative function of the discourse 
of tragedy, according to Sitze, was that it was a way: 
“…for colonial government to admit to the illegality and inhumanity of imperial 
slaughter, while at the same time articulating the impossibility of accepting legal 
guilt or even just legal responsibility for that slaughter.”99 
Thus in the case of the JRC its report typically served as a public document of lamentation 
and mourning; but simultaneously also served to exculpate alleged perpetrators from 
legal culpability. Hence the contradictions and incoherence of the ‘tragic discourse of 
official exoneration’. ‘Truth as tragedy’ operated in a way that may be linked to Ashforth’s 
’schemes of legitimation’, where   
“tragedy… emerges as a discourse of power…by which institutions vested with 
considerable administrative and discretionary power might ‘humanize’ themselves 
by ‘regretting’ or ‘lamenting’ the fact that they could not act.”100 
Sitze argues that, by effectively allowing perpetrators off the hook, these ‘tumult 
commissions’ did more to obscure than to reveal the ‘truth’ regarding the conflicts of the 
past. Hence, as the archetype tumult commission, Sitze concludes that it “was not a fact-
finding device, it was a ‘white-washing machine”.101 
In Sitze’s view the “whitewashing”, or exonerating function of tumult commissions is 
related to both the commission’s findings, as well as to the official discourse of the report 
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itself. In most cases ‘tumult commission’ findings “would exonerate the police from any 
allegations of violence and abuse [and]… would find that the police’s use of deadly force 
was justified by the necessities of the case.”102 In relation to Ashforth’s notion of the 
legitimating role of official discourse in commissions of inquiry, the official discourse of 
tragedy was indeed a discourse of power that justified the use of violence in the particular 
context. Conceived as a process of legitimating the police’s use of violence, the discourse 
of tragedy formed an official discourse of ‘truth’ that was fraught with contradictions and 
incoherence.  
2.4.2 The Case of the Jamaica Royal Commission (JRC) 
The following section seeks to clarify the “fact-finding” and “truth-seeking’ function in the 
case of the ‘archetypal’ tumult commission’- the Jamaica Royal Commission (JRC). What 
did it mean, in the British imperial context of the 1860s, for an official commission to 
inquire into the ‘truth’ regarding a violent suppression enacted by its own state agents on 
its colonial subjects? In relation to the function of official discourses of legitimation, the 
tragic discourse of the JRC ‘white-washed’ the violence committed by state officials as 
legitimate.  
In October 1865 a rebellion led by Baptist Deacon Paul Bogle laid siege to the square 
outside of the Courthouse in the town of Morant Bay, Jamaica. Legal disputes led to what 
was perceived as an unjust verdict being brought upon two black men, which caused mass 
political unrest in the town square.103 Martial Law was proclaimed by Governor Eyre and 
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in the days that followed a series of police raids and insurrections by former slaves 
culminated in a series of insurgencies and counter-insurgency operations in the 
surrounding districts, resulting in numerous atrocities committed by agents of the British 
colonial government. These included summary executions, torture and imprisonment of 
those suspected to have incited or been engaged in the rebellion. 
One the one hand, the JRC can be seen as having been set up as an official attempt to 
address calls among a portion of the British public who were appalled at the way in which 
the Morant Bay Rebellion had been violently thwarted.104 Indeed, these events must be 
seen in the context of the intensification of a specific humanitarian cause growing into 
and out of the abolitionist movement, which had led to the abolition of slavery in 1807. 
This is comparable to the modern human rights movement, and it mobilised public 
support by promulgating accounts of vicious atrocities committed on native people by 
colonies. This humanitarian movement was led primarily by missionaries, grounded in 
religious principles and the evangelical objectives of guiding ’natives’ towards religious 
salvation.  More specifically the JRC was a response to the ‘Jamaica Committee’- a group 
of British intellectuals led by J.S Mill who challenged Eyre’s claims to having acted legally 
under martial law and in terms of the prevailing indemnity acts when ordering 
executions as well as other tactics of intimidation and retribution.105 
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The JRC as an official commission of inquiry was eventually mandated to inquire only 
into the “origin and nature of the said disturbances, and with respect to the Measures 
adopted in the course of their Suppression.”106 It was not a tribunal or court of law 
empowered to make judicial verdicts with legal standing, nor was it specifically tasked 
with apportioning any individual or collective responsibility for the “said disturbances”. 
In practice the JRC, much as in the proceedings of an adversarial trial, was concerned 
with the truth and falsity of ‘facts’, i.e. with factual allegations pertaining to each case. The 
JRC held over sixty hearings and over 700 people testified. The Commission’s ’scheme of 
legitimation’ drew from traditional legal procedure, where it sought ‘facts’ pertaining to 
the uprisings: witnesses were sworn in before their examination and each witness was 
posed with questions of forensic detail that they were required to answer, guided by the 
questioner.  
9449. Do you remember Thursday morning in the week of the riot at Morant Bay: 
-Yes 
9450. What were you doing that morning? - I went to the fields as I generally do, 
and saw a large number of cane-hole diggers and planters all in one gang.  
 9451. How many? -About 60.  
9452. What were they doing; digging cane holes in the estate? - Yes, I found they 
had left work. That was 8 o' clock in the morning. 
9453. Is that the usual time to come off? - No; they come in about 8, or sometimes 
half past...107 
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As the above extract exemplifies, witnesses were asked questions that could be verified, 
such as the time of occurrences, the number of people present, with inquiries into 
regularities and irregularities in movement. Each witness’s testimony was recorded in the 
report along with other details such as their race, age, occupation and the area in which 
they lived. The report also contains citations from multitudes of court papers, documents 
and letters relevant to the administration of justice. As a forensic fact-finding machine 
the commission was thus able to document that 439 black and coloured people had been 
killed by British authorities, with the exact number of floggings, destruction of houses by 
burning and number of political arrests made, and aggregated by district.   
As an official fact-finding commission, performing similar investigative functions to a 
criminal trial, the commission’s ostensible impartiality served to legitimate its findings. 
For example, Governor Eyre had testified that many rioters had perpetrated horrendous 
crimes of their own towards the authorities. However, in its report the Commission 
concluded that Eyre’s claims were unfounded.108 Instead the JRC uncovered and recorded 
instances of atrocities inflicted during the rebellion; its legalistic process of ‘fact-finding’ 
and the findings were deemed objective (i.e. ‘truth as knowledge’) based on the rigorous 
process by which evidence was scrutinised in a seemingly impartial and objective manner. 
When compared to the environment provided by a Historical Commission, or by ‘Truth 
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Commissions’, the JRC was not a space for public “truth telling”, i.e. for witnesses to tell 
their own uninterrupted stories.  
However, a distinctive feature of the JRC as a ‘Tumult Commission’, unlike the ‘Native 
Question’ Commissions, was its ‘truth-seeking’ function.  Apart from its ability to attain 
‘truth as knowledge’, the JRC also performed a key function of ‘truth commissions’, that 
of establishing ‘truth as acknowledgment’. The JRC’s report found that the “atrocities 
that were perpetuated under the shield of martial law” by state agents had “deprived the 
people, for a longer than necessary period, of the great constitutional privileges by which 
the security of life and property is provided for”.109 The report stated that the punishments 
inflicted were “excessive”; that “the punishment of death was unnecessarily frequent”; 
that the “floggings were reckless and barbarous” and that the “burning of 1000 houses 
was wanton and cruel”.110 Thus the JRC’s findings served as an official acknowledgment 
of the injustice of the state violence that victims had suffered during the rebellion.  
In the view of the Jamaica Committee the JRC’s findings of fact revealed that there was 
serious culpability and Governor Eyre should face retribution for his actions before a 
court of law. But Mill was not merely determined to see Eyre face retribution for mass 
murder of Jamaicans; above all he was inquiring into the nature of Martial Law. At one 
point Mill compared Eyre to Robespierre, arguing that the issue was whether ‘martial law 
(was) indeed…what it (was) asserted to be, arbitrary power – the rule of force, subject to 
no legal limits’.111 The legal limits which Mill was invoking were the notion of the morality 
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of law founded upon a principled and pragmatic justice. In his passionate response to the 
JRC’s findings, Mill stated: 
“Upon [the fact’s] showing, the lives and subjects of Her Majesty have been 
wrongfully taken…and I maintain that when such things have been done, there is 
prima facie demand for legal punishment, and that a court of criminal justice can 
alone determine whether such punishment has been merited, and if merited, what 
ought to be its amount. The taking of human lives without justification, which is 
in this case an admitted fact, cannot be condoned by anything short of a criminal 
tribunal. Neither the Government, nor this House, not the whole English Nation 
combined can exercise pardoning power without previous trial and sentence. I 
know not for what more important purpose Courts of Law exist than for the 
security of human life… But if officers of the Government are to be allowed to take 
the lives of the Queen’s subjects improperly – as has been confessedly done in this 
case - without being called to judicial account, and having the excuses they make 
for it sifted and adjudicated by the tribunal in that case, we are giving up altogether 
the principle of government by law, and resigning ourselves to arbitrary power”.112 
Mill’s appeal that Eyre be criminally prosecuted, despite having acted under martial law, 
points directly to issues that transitional justice scholars would reckon with one hundred 
years later - the question of whether, and how, to punish what Kant called “radical evil” 
even if those ‘crimes’ were legal under the laws of the state at the time at which they were 
committed.113 However, in this extract Mill also touched on another crucial point in 
understanding the work of ‘Tumult Commissions’ when he stated “I know not for what 
more important purpose Courts of Law exist than for the security of human life…”. This 
is the issue of sovereignty and in particular, the distinction between legal and political 
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sovereignty. For Mill, the ex-ante or post-facto indemnification of acts of brutality was a 
clear act of unchecked political sovereignty which, to him, amounted to arbitrary power 
and was wholly inconsistent with the principle of legal sovereignty, or the rule of law. In 
its attempt to ‘come to terms’ with the perceived injustice, the JRC, contradicted its own 
fact-finding, and official acknowledgment of atrocities.  Its official narrative of ‘tragic’ 
necessity effectively served to justify the taking of lives, while the indemnity, as 
proclaimed by Martial law, obliterated the lines between political and legal sovereignty. 
In the case of the JRC the legitimating and exonerating functions of the narrative genre 
of the ‘tragic’ discourse served to legitimate the actions of the security agents, and 
exonerate the perpetrators of violence from criminal prosecution. Moreover, within the 
master narrative of the Commission, it breathed life into the ‘tragedy’ of what transpired 
at Morant Bay by supplying the true facts and figures of the ordeal, whilst maintaining 
that the security forces had acted out of unfortunate necessity, and hence no one was to 
blame.  
The ‘regime of truth’ within which the JRC operated also determined the limits of the 
prevailing humanitarian discourse in the particular colonial context. The commissioners 
ruled that according to law and practice, martial law was an established tradition and that 
it had been “proclaimed upon good reasons”.114 Hence, the indemnities were construed as 
legitimate and there was nothing to prosecute. From this perspective, the findings of the 
commission discursively and officially removed the possibility of legal action. Rather the 
impartial findings arrived at through legalistic procedure, as well as the narrative function 
                                                          




of the tragic discourse exonerated the actions of the security forces by the narrative that 
the atrocities were necessary and legitimate in their objective to restore social order.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter considered the various scholarly accounts of the functions of official 
commissions of inquiry using an organising scheme that distinguished between ‘fact-
finding’, official ‘truth-seeking’ and narrative role, particularly in legitimating the state’s 
contested authority in colonial and post-colonial contexts. Ashforth’s notion of ‘discursive 
schemes of legitimation’ assisted in clarifying how the procedure of gathering facts has 
particular relevance to the type of truth a commission authorises. Moreover, using the 
example of the NEC, it was explained how particular discursive schemes removed certain 
issues of social importance from the realm of political debate and presented them as 
matters resolved by scientific reason. To use Foucault’s terminology, official commissions 
operate in a ‘regime of truth’ in which speaking truth means speaking ‘truth’ as objectivity. 
The JRC’s procedure was comparable to Ashforth’s ‘schemes of legitimation’ and the 
‘Native Question’ Commissions, as it too followed legalistic procedures of the adversarial 
trial to authorise its findings. However, the JRC also revealed the potency of narrative 
relevant to understanding ‘tumult commissions’ in Colonial and post-colonial South 
Africa. The JRC’s mandate questioned the necessity of the police’s use of force in 
suppressing the Morant Bay rebellion, while its findings confirmed that the counter-
insurgency tactics had indeed been excessive. However, the overall narrative - the tragic 
discourse of official exoneration – had a particular operative role in colonial societies. It 
rendered the force of martial (indemnity) law legitimate thus blurring the distinction 




admittedly harsh, the state’s actions were justified as having been necessary to restore 
order to society. Linking this to Ashforth’s notion of Public Commissions presenting an 
idea of the state; the “tragic narrative” entrenched the idea of the State as having acted in 
the best interest of the population’s welfare and the ultimate safety of the population. The 
“whitewash” of the event is its effective painting over of ‘what actually happened’ with a 
narrative. ‘Tragedy’ is then the story of the loving and caring state that was reluctantly 
forced to resort to such violent deeds by necessity. 
The ambiguous findings of the JRC are significant in highlighting the ambivalent and 
contradictory functions of the official discourse of ‘Tumult commissions’. On the one 
hand, there is the objective of making impartial, neutral or scientific findings of fact 
regarding the specifics of the ‘event’ under investigation. On the other hand, there is a 
sense in which the findings can never be neutral due to their inherently political mandate 
– which is to restore society to a particular social order. Moreover, the effect of using the 
discourse objectivity in the official report was to legitimate its ‘fact-finding’ and hence 
‘truth-seeking’ project. In the end, however, the JRC undermined the prospect of 
accountability for the state officials, despite whose violence was publicly acknowledged as 






Chapter 3: Tumult Commissions in South Africa and the case 
of the Wessels Commission of Inquiry, following the 
Sharpeville Massacre. 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The historical and political context of Apartheid South Africa was radically different to 
the colonial context of the JRC. The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 led to 
the development of a centralised state under white minority rule, where racial segregation 
was the official policy until 1948, when the National Party (NP) government was elected 
committed to the policy of apartheid. By 1948 no Africans, the majority racial group, had 
the franchise.115  While pre-1948 segregation largely relied on informal practices, the 
Apartheid regime brought the systematic elaboration of explicitly racial legislation 
discursively supported by white supremacist ideologies of legitimation. This thrust South 
Africa into a unique regime of partial enfranchisement; a system in which mechanisms of 
political and social control were geared towards maintaining white-minority rule and 
economic privilege. The face of political control was hence overt force complemented by 
legalistic techniques of public policy and administration. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, commissions of inquiry were used ubiquitously as tools by which political control 
was rationalised in the public sphere in colonial and indeed post-colonial South Africa.   
In terms of Ashforth’s ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions of inquiry, state commissions 
intervened at moments of political tension to seek a ‘solution’ to a critical problem of 
governance. Moreover, the Commission’s public investigation formed part of a ritualised 
                                                          




performance whereby the display of a seemingly objective investigation served to 
authorise the consequent ‘solution’, presented in the commission’s findings as fact. The 
public function of a commission’s ‘investigative phase’, according to Ashforth, was to 
facilitate the establishment of ‘discursive schemes of legitimation’. Hence, the ‘native 
question’ commissions of inquiry followed specific procedural and discursive rules that 
contributed to their findings being presented to the public as objective truth in official 
discourse.116 This corresponds to Sitze’s notion of the ‘tumult commission’ as exemplified 
by the 1866 Jamaica Royal Commission (JRC). Running concurrent to, and hence 
comparable with, the ‘native question’ commissions, ‘tumult commissions’ investigated 
instances where the colonial police and/or military forces had brutally suppressed a riot 
or rebellion. According to Sitze, ‘tumult commissions’ functioned discursively by 
exonerating the police force from any form of criminal liability for their unavoidable use 
of lethal force. Typically the accounts provided in the reports of ‘tumult commissions’ 
were mired in the discourse of tragedy.117 
This chapter assesses the function of the Wessels Commission of Inquiry set up in 1960 
to inquire into the South African Police killing of 69 people in what is known as the 
‘Sharpeville Massacre’. The ‘Sharpeville Massacre’ was a response to the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC)-led campaign opposing the statutory requirement on African males to 
carry ‘Passbooks’.118 The Pass laws were a key mechanism by which the ideological 
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construction of ‘Grand Apartheid’ was implemented as the Apartheid regime’s policy of 
‘separate development’. In practise the Pass laws served to relegate Africans to designated 
Homelands (the ‘Bantustans’) whilst only being allowed into ‘white’ South Africa with a 
work permit or some other form of special permission.119 Beyond their rudimentary 
function of recording basic personal information, Passbooks became emblematic of the 
enduring indignity of Africans’ systemic oppression and the target of sustained resistance 
to Apartheid repression.120 The demands of the protests in 1960 were the abolition of the 
pass laws and a call for a minimum wage of £35 per month; a mass peaceful protest was 
planned where participants would present themselves for arrest by burning their pass 
books. The slogan was “no bail, no defence, no fines!” The anti-Pass Campaign was 
planned to launch on 21st of March 1960 and to last until 1963. However, the campaign 
was violently thwarted when the police fired 1 344 rounds into the crowd, killing 69 
people and wounding 186.121 The Government declared a state of emergency and the 
Wessels Commission of Inquiry was set up some days later to inquire generally into the 
facts surrounding the police killings. 
In contemporary discourse it is the Sharpeville Massacre, together with the Soweto 
Student Uprisings of 1976, to which the Marikana Massacre has been most often 
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compared.122 Less attention has been given to the mechanisms, such as Commissions of 
Inquiry, by which the state sought to investigate and legitimate these instances of 
violence. The literature is largely silent on how the official commissions of colonial and 
post-colonial, Apartheid and post-Apartheid commissions of inquiry may relate to one 
another. This chapter considers the political functions of the Wessels Commission in 
relation to the tradition of ‘Tumult commissions’ identified by Sitze. Distinguishing 
between the explicit and less overt roles of official commissions, I assess the functions of 
the Wessels Commission in terms of Ashforth’s legitimating schemes: ‘fact-finding’, 
‘truth-seeking’, and the ways in which the Commission operated to espouse an official 
narrative on the Sharpeville ‘tragedy’. More specifically, it assesses the extent to which 
the ‘tumult commissions’ of Apartheid South Africa may be compared with colonial 
‘tumult commissions’, like the JRC, that ‘whitewashed’, or justified unlawful state killings 
as regrettable necessities.  
3.2 The Legal fetishism of Apartheid’s repressive order.  
The Apartheid regime was a peculiar hybrid of sustained white minority domination on 
the one hand, but with all the ‘democratic’ trimmings of civil courts, a parliamentary 
system of government, and a seemingly independent press on the other. It went to great 
lengths to elaborate and sustain this intricate legalistic façade, aptly described by 
Mamdani as exhibiting “a legal fetishism”.123 The bulk of Apartheid’s definitive legislation 
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was enacted during the 1950s: The Populations Registration Act (1950)124 classified the 
population into three distinct race groups that afforded or denied each race particular 
citizenship rights; it restricted the freedom of movement and residence for Coloured and 
African South Africans, which in turn limited economic and labour opportunities. The Act 
was met with a civil disobedience campaign known as the ‘Defiance Campaign’, led by the 
African National Congress (ANC). However, the NP government only retaliated with 
further racially restrictive legislation. The Natives Labour (Settlement of Dispute) Act of 
1953 prohibited Africans from engaging in any labour-related strike action. The Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of the same year provided that anyone who was accompanying or 
supported someone found guilty of offenses committed during political protests, or that 
supported campaigns against Apartheid Laws, would be presumed guilty and the 
responsibility would be on them to prove their innocence.125 
Further legislation relating to “riotous assemblies” was passed in 1956 prohibiting actions 
that stimulated “feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European 
inhabitants of the Union and matters incidental thereto”.126 Anyone seen to have acted in 
contravention of this Act would be “guilty of an offense” and be liable on conviction to 
imprisonment.127 In addition, the Public Safety Act of 1953 provided government the 
authority to declare a state of emergency at will. A state of emergency would effectively 
suspend civil liberties and it permitted either the Minister of Law and Order, the 
Commissioner of the South African Police, a magistrate or any commissioned officer to 
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detain, without trial, any person for the objective of “public safety”.128 Such a state of 
emergency was declared in the days following the Sharpeville Massacre, and in 1961 an 
indemnity law was passed that indemnified state actors acting either under government’s 
or their own authority from an act done “in good faith for the suppression of internal 
disorder” or the “preservation of life or property”.129 This Act effectively indemnified the 
Apartheid security forces’ brutal actions while enforcing a state of emergency. As was 
noted in Chapter 2, indemnity laws formally obliterate the distinction between legal and 
political sovereignty which, as Mill articulated during the JRC in 1866, is the marker of 
unchecked political power.  
This hyper-legalistic environment corresponded with the complex nature of repression, 
which Tina Rosenberg termed a ‘criminal regime’ as distinct from a ‘regime of 
criminals’.130 The distinction depends on whether the ‘crimes’ committed were committed 
by state agents acting un-officially / outside the law or systemic in character. In the case 
of a ‘regime of criminals’ there is a clear distinction between perpetrators, victims and 
beneficiaries while in the case of a ‘criminal regime’ the ’crimes’ themselves were officially 
sanctioned and therefore ‘legal’ at the time they were committed. In the latter case the 
distinction between perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries and bystanders is more complex 
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as silent yet assenting beneficiaries and collaborators may have significant roles in the 
regime’s persistence. Rosenberg’s distinction brings out the key differences between Latin 
American dictatorships, and the experience of Eastern European communist regimes.131 
Her distinction is useful in considering the Apartheid regime as a ‘hybrid’ regime, as it 
was characterized by legalistic structures as well as by a web of collusion by state 
institutions, individuals and the Private Sector alike, similar to Eastern European 
‘criminal regimes’, but also engaged in illicit and secret operations, of counter insurgency, 
like the Latin American ‘regimes of criminals’, to ensure regime survival. 
However, by 1960 South Africa was increasingly confronted by an international network 
of states that condemned Apartheid laws and practice. Apartheid’s policies of racial 
exclusion were challenged vehemently both locally and abroad, particularly following the 
Second World War with the establishment of the United Nations.132 The defeat of Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War and subsequent revelations of the abhorrent 
treatment of Nazi victims and the Nazi ideology of racial superiority led to the drafting of 
new human rights treaties -- the UN Charter and the recognition of the Declaration of 
Human Rights.133 Hence, as news of the Sharpeville massacre spread to international 
audiences it precipitated substantial withdrawals of international investment, which 
threatened a severe economic crisis. South Africa left the British Commonwealth in 1961; 
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a reflection of the NP government’s tenacity to maintain Apartheid in the face of domestic 
and international condemnation. In this particular context, Apartheid ideology and 
apologists of the Apartheid state rationalised official policy in terms of ‘Separate 
Development’ in an effort to legitimate “the illegitimate”. As Stanley Greenberg 
commented in his book on Apartheid South Africa entitled Legitimating the Illegitimate: 
“Few states operate within a legal and ideological framework that appears to 
mandate dependence on direct coercion and preclude the search for more 
consensual methods. … There is a completeness to a repressive order that, at the 
top, leaves the African majority without any legal political representation or 
national identity and, at the bottom, subjects them to "group areas", "tribal 
authorities," and police raids of various sorts. The African majority, formally 
outside the dominant political arrangements and the subject of such repressive 
policies, have affirmed in practice what seems necessary in theory - the illegitimacy 
of the South African State.”134 
Greenberg’s depiction captures the totality of the Apartheid state’s repressive character 
concretising the legalistic fetishism of the laws cited above. What the Sharpeville 
shootings exposed was that, contrary to the ideological claims of ‘Separate Development’, 
the Apartheid regime did both resort to, and depended on, the exercise of arbitrary 
coercive power and state violence to maintain minority rule. 
3.3 The Powers of Commissions of Inquiry in Apartheid South Africa 
In order to effectively “legitimate the illegitimate”, in the case of the Sharpeville mass 
killing of civilians by state agents, the status of an official commission as a credible and 
authoritative public institution was required. In apartheid South Africa commissions of 
                                                          




inquiry were no longer appointed by the Queen, but by the South African Governor-
General. Technically the commissions set up in South Africa were not ‘Royal 
Commissions’ but Commonwealth Commissions, as defined by the (British) Tribunal of 
Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921; and later, the South African Commissions Act of 1947.135 
However, the powers conferred by both Acts are strikingly similar in terms of the 
discretionary powers of Commissions they authorise, and the powers of the Commission 
to subpoena witnesses and evidence relevant to fulfilling its mandate. Generally, 
Commonwealth Commissions have subpoena powers as well as the discretionary power 
to hold their hearings either in public or in camera.  
Whether implicitly or explicitly, most South African Commissions adopted the ‘Royal 
Commission’ as their model, where due to their considerable discretionary powers they 
could define their own procedures and hence render particular legal provisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
irrelevant.136 This point is of critical import in tracing the various functions of ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ in South Africa. It suggests that although individual commissions of 
inquiry may be set up for specified reasons, supported by relevant legislation and guided 
by a particular mandate, they also can and do draw upon and repeat techniques and 
practices utilised by past Commissions, and so derive legitimacy from established 
historical practices.  Hence, Sitze claims that South African ‘Tumult Commissions’ 
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“repeated a few of the more specific techniques and practices we see exemplified in the 
JRC”, creating a firm tradition of ‘Tumult Commissions’ in South Africa.137 In this way, 
drawing upon the established modes of colonial Royal Commissions and Commonwealth 
Commissions of Inquiry, commissions such as the Wessels Commission were situated 
within a tradition of established colonial schemes used to manage resistance to colonial 
rule.  
3.4 The Wessels Commission of Inquiry 
3.4.1 Fact-Finding in the Wessels Commission 
The Wessels Commission was in session from April 11th 1960 to June 16th 1960, meaning 
that it sat for a total of 43 days.138 The objective of the Commission, as stipulated by its 
Terms of Reference, was “to investigate and report on the occurrences in the Districts 
Vereeniging (namely at Sharpeville Location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province 
of the Transvaal, on 21 March 1960”.139 Clearly, this mandate specifies the Commission’s 
core objective to be that of ‘fact-finding’ as distinct from ‘truth-seeking’. As will be detailed 
below, the Commission’s findings of ‘facts’ may be organised into two general types: 
objectively verifiable findings relating to specifics of what had transpired at Sharpeville 
on 21 March 1960; and findings relating to the mental and emotional dispositions of those 
involved in the incident. 
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Moreover, the Commission was “event specific” – it was mandated to inquire into the 
occurrences at a particular location on one specific day.140 Generally, event-specific 
commissions of inquiry may be used to gather further information regarding a ‘tragedy’ 
such as the Sharpeville shootings to determine whether the need exists to launch legal 
proceedings of a formal, civil, criminal or disciplinary nature.141 As provided for by the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1947, the Wessels Commission technically did have the 
lawful power to make findings pursuant to further criminal investigation, i.e. findings of 
legal responsibility, had this been considered as within the general purpose of the 
commission.142 Having developed out of the tradition of Commonwealth Commissions, 
the Wessels Commission borrowed some of the useful procedures and discretionary 
powers to fulfil its mandate that were characteristic of Commonwealth Commissions, 
including powers of search and seizure, summons and subpoena powers. Wessels 
affirmed the immense discretionary powers these types of Commissions have by claiming 
at the start that all proceedings would be entirely decided by him.143 However, according 
to his interpretation of the Terms of Reference, the Commission would not apportion legal 
culpability nor “report on the liability of persons for their acts and omissions” as, 
according to its understanding, this was considered “outside the scope” of instruction.144 
Furthermore, neither of the main parties involved, i.e. members of the PAC or the SAPS, 
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was represented by legal counsel, whilst the other interested parties were represented by legal 
practitioners.145 Tellingly, the Wessels Commission report begins with a confident claim to 
its objective fact-finding charge, “After due consideration I decided that the task which 
Your Excellency assigned to the Commission was this, namely, to collect evidence in 
connection with the occurrences concerned and in the light thereof to report on my 
findings of fact”.146 Furthermore, Wessels indicated from the outset that the Commission 
was not a court of law, but that nonetheless, investigative proceedings would be guided 
by “certain considerations of reasonableness”.147 This may be taken as an instance of 
Ashforth’s ‘legitimating schemes’: the appearance of following legal procedure and rules 
had the effect of authenticating the Commission’s findings as ‘objective facts’. 
The Wessels Commission retained essential features of the Commonwealth Commissions 
model – it was held in public, it had powers of subpoena and its proceedings resembled 
that of a criminal trial.148 This is relevant to the performative significance of the 
commission. As Katherine Leader commented on the spectacle of the criminal trial, the 
“performance [of the trial] is central to the trial process” as the spectacle of the adversarial 
criminal trial “involves a performance of tradition that positions the trial itself in society 
as a bulwark of justice, antiquity and authority.”149 Leader’s use of the efficacy of 
‘performance’ in the criminal trial may be compared with Ashforth’s notion of official 
Commissions as a ‘theatre of power’ in which the central ‘truths’ of official discourse are 
ritually enacted. The Wessels Commission indeed appeared to perform a semblance of 
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‘justice’ in action, whilst simultaneously admitting to its impotence to make findings on 
the criminal liability of state agents.  
The issue at stake is the political function of an official commission of inquiry, or ‘tumult 
commission’, in the context of Apartheid’s highly legalistic, but illiberal democracy. 
Wessels frequently emphasized the limitations on the ‘findings of fact’ the Commission 
could make. He stated that it was not within the scope of the Commission to make 
recommendations;150 and it also would not determine whether any of the police actions 
indicated that they were “guilty of any neglect of duty or contravention of any provision 
of the law”.151 This, however, meant that the Commission could not take its findings of 
‘facts’ to their logical conclusion, as criminal prosecutions would have done, as it did not 
have the power to make findings of legal standing. When compared to the colonial JRC, 
these selective findings of ‘fact’ may be viewed as a continuation of colonial practices 
within Apartheid South Africa. It also confirms Sitze’s assertion concerning the ‘fact-
finding’ role of ‘Tumult Commissions’ in South Africa, that whilst their mandates 
stipulated broad objectives of ‘fact-finding’, ‘Tumult Commissions’ ultimately gathered 
evidence relating to the “necessity of the use of police and military force in suppressing 
the riots and rebellions”.152 
To carry out its ‘fact-finding’ mandate, the Wessels Commission attempted to make 
forensic-like findings of ‘fact’ regarding objectively verifiable items such as the size of the 
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crowd of protestors,153 the actions of the protestors and ballistic specifications, such as 
the particulars regarding who gave orders to shoot, and the duration of the shooting.154 
On the other hand, it also made ‘factual’ findings relating to the disposition of the crowd 
determined by cross-examination. Indeed, the Commission report devoted considerable 
attention to discerning the ‘mood’ of the protestors, and the police’s interpretation 
thereof. The local Sharpeville residents were presented in dichotomous terms, either as 
the hapless individuals whose actions were guided by irrational passions, or as accidental 
victims of the state’s violence. Mr Labuschagne testified on his observations of the protest 
march: “I climbed on the lorry and they were one black mass from the school to the 
hall.”155 Testimony from a Lieutenant Visser similarly presented the protestors as a 
volatile, unthinking mob: “It was clear that the crowd was working themselves up to 
something. Whether they were themselves aware of what they were working themselves 
up to, I do not know. But it was clear they were becoming more and more unruly and out 
of control.”156 Similar to the attitude shown towards the ‘native’ testifiers at the JRC, the 
mental soundness of the African witnesses testifying to the Sharpeville shootings was 
often called into question, undermining the credibility and reliability of their testimony. 
Typically it was observed that “from the previous night a large number of the 
demonstrators were probably involved in incidents which must have affected their 
emotional state”.157 
                                                          
153 The size of the protestors was an object of contestation, with some witnesses such as Major Van Zyl stating that 
the numbers were between 8000 and 10 000., Captain Cawood estimating 5000-7000 and Labusachagne saying that 
there were 5000, The Wessels Commission Report, p. 52, 65, 101 
154 See The Wessels Commission Report Chapters 5 and 6, ‘Occurrences in the District of Vereeniging”. 
155 The Wessels Commission Report, Ch 6 p. 74 
156 Wessels Commission Report, p. 105 




As we have seen, Sitze attributed the “curiosity” in the protestors’ “feelings”, “passions”, 
or “state of mind”, characteristic of ‘Tumult Commissions’, to a particular ‘colonial 
condition’ concerned with avoiding war.158 He described this therapeutic discourse, 
concerned with questions of the psyche, or soul, of the protestors, as an attempt to 
understand and hence manage the conflict.159 He concluded that “all tumult commissions 
needed to function as reconciliation commissions”.160 The Wessels Commission report 
was also concerned to make ‘factual’ findings concerning the states of mind of the police 
involved in the shootings: 
“I have already mentioned that the men who fired held out in their evidence that 
they were at that moment of opinion that their lives were in danger. Whether such 
a state of mind existed is, of course, a question of fact. Although some of the police 
witnesses did not impress me, I think it can be accepted that this state of mind was 
probably present in the men who fired”.161 
As a legitimating scheme, therapeutic discourse is distinct from the discourse of 
objectivity. The technique effectively removed guilt from the shooters by affirming that 
they were justified in feeling threatened and hence, were essentially not guilty in intention 
or act.  
3.4.2‘Truth-Seeking’ and ‘Truth-Telling’ After Sharpeville. 
The Wessels Commission made no special claims to ‘truth-seeking’ or ‘truth-telling’ in the 
way that a ‘truth commission’ might. It did, however, make findings of fact on the 
particulars of the event under investigation in the same way that a court of law would. 
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Like the JRC in Jamaica, the proceedings of the Wessels Commission drew on those of 
Royal Commissions and Commonwealth Commissions by taking the form of an 
adversarial trial. Therefore, witnesses were sworn in prior to giving testimony and any 
person found to have given “false evidence before [the] commission… knowing such 
evidence to be false or not believing it to be true” would be guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to the prescribed sentence.162 Hence the ‘truth-telling’ function of the 
Commission was strictly linked to attaining ‘truth as factual knowledge’. 
Moreover, to meet its objectives of ‘fact-finding’, it was neither necessary nor common 
practise that the Commission be ‘victim-centred’. This applied to ‘Tumult Commissions’ 
generally. Although Sitze asserted that the JRC “sought to give voice to the suffering of 
the natives”163 there is no evidence to suggest that such ‘testimony’ was treated any 
differently from that which would be considered either relevant or irrelevant to a 
particular civil case in a court of law. If anything (as Sitze himself cites from the JRC’s 
account of the testimony of the ’natives’, or what would today be referred to as the ‘victims’ 
of the massacre), the value of the testimony was considered in terms of its relevance to 
the aims of the commission, which was strictly that of ‘fact-finding’, and not of ’truth-
telling’ or with the aims of restoration. It is useful to quote an extract from the JRC’s 
report to illustrate this point. 
“In many cases the witnesses manifested a singular ignorance of the nature and 
value of evidence, as well as a misconception of the proper scope of the Inquiry. 
As regards the negroes, it is enough to recall the fact that they were for the most 
part uneducated peasants, speaking in accents strange to the ear, often in a 
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phraseology of their own, with vague conceptions of number and time, 
unaccustomed to definiteness or accuracy of speech, and, in many cases, still 
smarting under a sense of injuries sustained. 
Many of them, again, misconceived the object of the commission, and came to tell 
their tale of houses burnt or property lost, in the undisguised hope of obtaining 
compensation…Even as regards the other witnesses, many even of the educated 
class could often scarcely be restrained from giving opinions in general and 
positive terms as equivalent to facts, or from stating as facts within their own 
knowledge matter communicated to them by others. 
A considerable body of evidence, especially in relation to the state of the Island, 
was thus tendered, which, on being sifted by us, proved of but little value.”164 
Nonetheless the JRC maintained, despite having acquired “redundant” evidence, that it 
was satisfied that the Inquiry “has been both thorough in fact, and thorough likewise in 
the estimation of the persons most concerned”.165 
The extract indicates that the colonial ‘Tumult Commission’ was not intended as a space 
in which ‘victims’ could ‘tell their tale’ of their experience of abuse, i.e. of their houses 
burnt or their property lost.166 They were supposed merely to be vessels of information 
from which to extract relevant knowledge to the Commission. Similarly, after cross-
                                                          
164 Report of the Jamaica Royal Commission, Part 1, 8 [Emphasis Mine] 
165The Jamaica Royal Commission, Section 1, p. 8 
166The Commission had some funds at its disposal to pay those who had travelled to Spanish Town to give evidence 
before the Commission and it appears that some victims were hopeful that they would receive some form of 
compensation, or ’reparative justice’, for their material possessions that were vandalised by the British Security 
forces in the suppression of the Morant Bay uprising. However, Royal Commissions, and Commissions of Inquiry 
generally, do not serve purposes of allotting compensation, or reparations. Instead, and as was also provided by the 
Commissions Act of 1947, official commissions will have a certain amount of funds with which they may pay out 
‘witness fees’ much in the same way as a witness may receive payment for testifying at a criminal trial: “Any person 
who has been summoned to attend any sitting of a commission as a witness or who has given evidence before a 
commission shall be entitled to the same witness fees from public funds, as if he had been summoned to attend or 
had given evidence at a criminal trial in a superior court held at the place of such a sitting, and in connection with 
the giving of evidence or the production of any book or document before a commission, the law relating to privilege 
as applicable to a witness giving evidence or summoned to produce a book or document in such a court, shall apply”, 




examination by expert lawyers Wessels stated “The Bantu Witnesses were… rather 
unreliable as far as reckoning time is concerned and it is therefore, possible that they did 
not hear the rumour as early as they made out.”167 In both the Colonial JRC and 
Apartheid-era Wessels Commission, the overall reliability of ‘native’ testimony was 
questioned when it did not conform to the strict legal codes of admissible evidence. These 
case examples substantiate Ashforth’s point that the authority of the Commission’s 
findings as ’objective truths’ were established by the process of hearing testimony as 
would a court of law. However, neither of these Commissions were designed to 
acknowledge the individual, subjective experiences of those the state had harmed. 
Related to the intersection of the processes of a court of law and a Commission of Inquiry 
is the use of cross-examination as a legal means by which ’truth’ is verified. It was not the 
usual procedure of the Wessels Commission, as a fact-finding commission of inquiry, to 
make use of cross-examination. However, on occasion Judge Wessels alluded to its use as 
a means to attain ‘truth’. He stated,  
“Where evidence is given under oath or after solemn affirmation, as was the case 
here, cross-examination is a recognized and sometimes effective method of testing 
the reliability thereof provided it is undertaken by a skilled person…The course of 
the proceedings proved again that effective cross-examination is sometimes the 
only way to arrive at the truth”.168 
From this, one may ascertain that part of the Wessels Commission’s ‘scheme of 
legitimation’ was that it operated within a ’regime of truth’ analogous to a court of law. 
Like the JRC, the Wessels Commission was not a space for public truth-telling and the 
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cross-examination of witnesses ensured that there would be no ’extra-legal’ truths under 
the gaze of the Commission.  
Moreover, the legalistic ‘criminal regime’ that characterised Apartheid and which 
outlawed protest, public gatherings and political dissent of any form, including the very 
laws (Pass laws) that had precipitated the protests, remained far outside the ‘regime of 
truth’ within which the Wessels Commission operated. To use Audrey Chapman and 
Patrick Ball’s distinction, the Wessels Commission did not inquire into the ‘macro-truths’, 
or long term structural causes of the violence, but focused on the ‘micro-truths’, limiting 
its inquiries to the night prior to the protest and the day of the shootings.169 In neglecting 
the structural causes of the protest however – in wholly constraining the regime of truth 
to micro truths -- the Commission undermined the thrust of the legitimate grievances felt 
by the protestors and privileged the official version as presented by the Police.  
The Commission Report was heavily one-sided. Sharpeville residents' testimony was 
referred to only occasionally, whilst it recapitulated the Police's evidence in great detail. 
Because of the fearful political climate under the state of emergency, in addition to 
existing laws that criminalised ‘riotous assemblies’, local residents could hardly speak 
freely in giving evidence and in many cases their testimony echoed that of the police - that 
                                                          
169 For Chapman and Ball macro truth provides a framework to understand the structural influences of violence, and 
which may point to the broader causes or intellectual foundations of the conflict under study. Comparatively, micro 
truth refers to those particular circumstances and personnel that led to the committing of particular individual 
crimes. Chapman, Audrey and Patrick Ball. “Levels of Truth: Macro Truth and the TRC” in A Chapman and H Van der 





they had no prior knowledge of the PAC’s campaign and had joined the strike due to 
intimidation.170 Hence, victim participation was, as best, constrained. 
In his study of the Sharpeville massacre and its consequences, Tom Lodge observed that 
for two decades after the 1960 shootings there was no public discussion regarding the 
events at Sharpeville.171 One victim claimed that “we were forced to forget about the 
shootings, because if you spoke about them you were arrested”.172 Therefore, within this 
particular post-colonial, apartheid context the Wessels Commission could not reasonably 
make any claims to ‘truth-seeking’, nor was the Commission a space in which victims 
could speak truth to power. Indeed, the Wessels Commission concealed more than it 
revealed and, as Sitze concluded, it provided “little more than an empty legal husk that 
continued to repeat colonial truths under postcolonial conditions, conditions in which 
those truths openly appeared to be untruths”.173 
3.4.3 Narrative Function: ‘Whitewashing Machines’ finding ‘No one to Blame’ 
As the previous two sections demonstrated, the ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’ of the 
Wessels commission was strictly limited to the narrowly-defined legal facts surrounding 
the Sharpeville massacre. Unlike the ‘Native Question’ Commissions that used expert 
anthropologists and economists to provide the terms for speaking about the ‘native 
problem’ and offer expert ‘solutions’, the Wessels Commission did not use experts to 
validate its official findings. However, as was the case in ‘Native Question’ Commissions, 
                                                          
170Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: an apartheid massacre and its consequences, p. 328 In addition, laws like the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of 1953 stipulated that anyone who accompanied or supported a person found guilty of 
offences during a protest would also be presumed guilty, and the onus would be on them to prove their innocence. 
171Ibid, p. 329 
172Jasper Van der Bliek (Ed). Sharpeville Scars, p. 42 




the selective facts posited as the ‘official truth’ concerning the mass killings contributed 
to the overall official narrative that the Commission facilitated: that the police had acted 
in the belief that their lives were in danger and to prevent further violence and disorder 
by the African anti-Pass demonstrators. Laws like the Public Safety Act provided the legal 
context in which officers acting in the interest of ‘public safety’ were not held liable for 
their actions, and those who gathered in protest were presumed as guilty under the 
Riotous Assemblies Act. With these laws in place, the discursive role of the Commission 
consisted in seeking to persuade the public and international community that the police 
had acted reasonably. 
As Hayden White argued, narratives involve particular ontological and epistemic choices 
with regard to how a story is recounted, while these choices have distinct ideological and 
political consequences.174 In this case the way in which Wessels interpreted the mandate 
of the Commission predetermined the findings and the version of the facts that was 
authorized as the ‘true’ version of the event. Wessels stated at the outset that the 
Commission would not report on the liability of persons; in consequence the 
Commission’s narrative found that no one was indeed liable. To use Sitze’s terminology, 
the language of “concomitant causes” encompassed the tragic discourse of official 
exoneration, concluding that no one was to blame. 
The concluding pages of the report affirmed that the ‘trend of evidence’ provided by the 
police confirmed that they believed that their lives were in danger, which justified their 
shooting. This is despite the evidence that many of the protestors were shot in the back 
                                                          




fleeing the scene, or the photographic evidence contradicting police testimony.175 The 
prevailing discourse depicted the protestors as violent and unruly, while Wessels 
maintained that "there could not be the slightest doubt" that the PAC protest was 
preceded by a night of "violence and threats of violence", which had contributed to the 
feelings of distrust and fear among the police officers. Submissions by the police painted 
the crowd as ‘armed’, ‘rebellious’ and ‘noisy’, stating that a ‘bloodbath was inevitable’, 
despite the fact that the protestors were at best armed with knobkerries and stones.176 The 
language and discourse is heavily imbued with the racist rhetoric of the ‘swart gevaar’, 
or ’black peril’, derived from colonial discourses of ‘barbaric’ African customs. Colonel 
Pienaar added, “The native mentality does not allow them to gather for a peaceful 
demonstration. For them, to gather means violence”.177 These discursive schemes worked 
in tandem with the legalistic charade of the Commission to justify the police response to 
the PAC demonstration as well as to provide a dramatic narrative of the Sharpeville 
massacre, and the terms in which it could be legitimately spoken of. The ‘truth’ of the 
massacre was reduced to discerning whether the level of force used was justified. To 
accomplish this verdict, considerable attention was given to the facts surrounding an 
alleged ‘attack’ on the police fence by one of the protestors, which had driven one of the 
                                                          
175For instance, police denied carrying sjamboks when photographs taken at the time refuted this. Moreover, police 
accounts denied having fired shots from the vantage points of their armoured vehicles and claimed that shooting 
was done by men on the ground, where visibility was not good and where their cues were taken from the 'mood' of 
the people directly in front of them – photographs by Ian Berry reveal this to be untrue. Judge Wessels also did not 
inquire into why it was that police continued to fire shots after protesters had turned to flee, nor did he explore why 
some police reloaded weapons and continued shooting. See Frankel, Philip. An ordinary atrocity: Sharpeville and its 
massacre (Yale University Press, 2001) 
176 The general trend of police submission to the commission is apparent from pages 121-131 of the Wessels 
Commission Report.  




police to fire the first shot.178 However, the conclusion reached was not only evasive, but 
neglected a range of factual evidence in order to authorize an official verdict that 
supported the narrative sanctioning the state killings. As Wessels stated in his concluding 
remarks,  
“After linking all the evidence and probabilities I have come to the conclusion that 
I can find neither that there was an attack at the gate nor that there was in fact no 
attack. Be that as it may, the first shots by police had a decisive effect on events. It 
would serve no useful purpose to consider how matters would have developed if 
no shots had been fired at that moment. Possibly there would have been no loss of 
life. It is also possible that there would have been a worse bloodbath.”179 
It is clear that the Wessels Commission was one which spoke the ‘truth’ of what was useful 
to the State’s objectives. It is for this reason that the Wessels Commission could refer to 
the Sharpeville massacre as “less a crime than a regrettable and lamentable tragedy”.180 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter situated the Wessels Commission within the chronology of Royal and 
Commonwealth Commissions of Inquiry, and more specifically of ‘Tumult Commissions’. 
In line with the Commonwealth Commission tradition, the Wessels Commission followed 
‘impartial’ and quasi-legal procedures to define the object of its inquiry. A more specific 
analysis of the legitimating functions of the Wessels Commission as an Apartheid ‘tumult 
commission’, showed that it functioned to justify the actions of the police, both to 
domestic and international stakeholders and abroad. It did this by framing its findings 
                                                          
178 The logic was that had an attack occurred at the gate, the police may have been justified in feeling threatened, 
which could be interpreted as warranting the firing of their guns. 
179 The Wessels Commission, p. 183 




within the grand narrative of the security forces having acted in the interest of protecting 
the social order. Hence, the ‘legitimating schemes’ of the Wessels Commission were 
identified in terms of three distinct but related mechanisms. First, the official status of 
the commission as a state-sanctioned institution permitting the commission report’s 
representation of the Sharpeville massacre as ‘the truth’, posited as an ‘official history’. 
Second,  the appropriation of specific procedures and functions of the legal tradition, e.g. 
the use of cross-examination of witnesses; and third, the discursive strategies of the 
‘tragic’ narrative that functioned as a mechanism that exonerated the police, while at the 
same time, admitting the ‘facts’ of the massacre. 
Compared to the way in which ‘Native Question’ Commissions utilized expert economist 
and anthropologist testimony to provide reasonable knowledge on the development of 
native homelands, the Wessels Commission did not rely on this particular type of ‘expert’ 
or ‘intellectual’ validation as a legitimation scheme. Rather, it relied on formalised, strict 
procedures mimicking that of a criminal trial that fed into the authentication of the 
findings as ‘objective facts’. In many ways this legalistic discourse was symptomatic of the 
‘legal-fetishism’ of Apartheid’s ‘criminal regime’, blurring the lines between legality and 
criminality.  
Finally, in opting to inquire solely into the immediate facts surrounding the massacre and 
ignoring the ‘macro-truths’ and structural, economic conditions that spurred the 
protestors grievances the Commission was implicated in the very problem it sought to 
solve instead of proposing a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’. Characterising the nature of 
Apartheid’s repression as a post-colonial ‘criminal regime’ paints a picture where the lines 




illegitimate agency resided within contesting “regimes of truth”. As the Comaroffs argued 
in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, in many post-colonial contexts the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate agency is “a frontier in the struggle to assert sovereignty or to 
disrupt it, to expand or contract the limits of the il/licit, to sanction or outlaw violence”.181 
Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry was a tool by which predatory apartheid police were 
officially exonerated from criminal guilt, and where those involved in the uprising were 
narrated as villains. However, like the JRC, the ‘truth’ of the Wessels commission 
functioned to legitimate injustice and impunity, which effectively undermined the 
‘objectivity’ of the commission’s findings. 
The Sharpeville Massacre marked the beginning of the liberation forces’ armed struggle 
against Apartheid. The date of the Sharpeville Massacre also marks the date from which 
the mandate of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, demarcated the 
time frame of its investigation into gross human rights violations. As stated in Chapter 
One, the TRC is widely acknowledged as a truth commission and instrument of 
transitional justice designed to ease South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to 
democracy. However, as I argued in Chapter 2 following Freeman, truth commissions 
form a sub-type within the conceptual umbrella of commissions of inquiry. The following 
Chapter discusses the implications of this on the TRC’s ‘truth-seeking’ and the extent to 
which it remained faithful to the ‘Tumult Commission’ tradition in South Africa.  
 
  
                                                          








Scholarship on the TRC has given little attention to its relation to Royal and 
Commonwealth Commissions of Inquiry, specifically those with mandates of ‘fact-
finding’ into incidents of state-sponsored violence. Unlike the JRC and the Wessels 
Commission, the TRC was not ‘event-specific’.182 It was tasked to inquire into the vast 
array of human rights abuses committed in apartheid South Africa between 1 March 1960 
and the cut-off date.183 It was designed as “part of the bridge-building process” to guide 
South Africa’s transition to democracy; it also sought to signify a definitive departure from 
Apartheid’s ‘criminal regime’ and restore public confidence in the new democracy.184 
Hence, it has conventionally been studied within the hermeneutical field of transitional 
justice.  
                                                          
182As Freeman argues, truth commissions form another type of commission of inquiry apart from event-specific, 
thematic, socio-historical and institutional commissions of inquiry. See Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural 
Fairness, p. 53-58 
183 The mandate stipulated that the Commission should establish “as complete a picture as possible of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from I March 
1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as 
the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of 
the violations, by conducting investigations and holding hearings”. It should also facilitate the “granting of amnesty 
to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and 
comply with the requirements of this Act”; establish and publicise the fate or whereabouts of victims and restore 
the human and civil dignity of such victims “by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the 
violations of which they are the victims”, as well as make recommendations for reparation measures in respect of 
its findings. TRC Report Vol 1, Ch 4, Section 31 (a) 
184 The report further states that the TRC’s purpose should be understood as one part in and among a number of 
mechanisms to promote democracy, i.e. the Land Claims Court, the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights, 
Gender and Youth Commissions. Together, these institutions were intended to assist in the “transformation of South 




Truth commissions and ‘truth-seeking’ processes are usually compared with and 
differentiated from other modes of transitional justice, namely criminal trials, collective 
amnesia or lustration.185 The transitional justice literature, for example key texts by Kritz, 
Rotberg and Thompson, and Minow raise various kinds of issues --some moral, legal and 
political -- pertaining to how societies come to terms with their conflict-ridden past and 
move towards a more just, reconciled and democratic polity.186 The comparative literature 
on transitional justice commonly tends to frame truth commissions within the ‘truth 
versus justice’ debate, or the relative priority given to the interests of different sets of 
actors, e.g. “perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries, collaborators, bystanders or others”.187 
Depending on the nature of the regime, different “moral needs” arise. States must ask 
themselves what need is greater, in order to help society move on - justice, accountability 
and retribution on the one hand [i.e. bringing perpetrators to justice]; or restoring human 
and civic dignity to victims [i.e through ‘truth-seeking’, ‘truth-telling’ and reconciliation 
or processes of redistribution]; or which particular groups unduly benefitted from the 
oppression of another group.188 
                                                          
185 Lustration refers to the systematic vetting of government officials associated with the Communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe and purging them from public positions. In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria lustration laws 
were passed that barred those associated with the former regime from state positions, or from academic posts, 
respectively. In East Germany information was divulged from their personal files. In a sense, this constitutes a kind 
of ‘truth-finding’ process as official information concerning state collaborators were made public. See Rosenberg, 
"Overcoming the legacies of dictatorship." p. 134-152. Lustration may also be linked to Jon Elster’s notion of 
‘administrative justice’ – “purges in the public administration” Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical 
perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 92 
186 Kritz, Transitional justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes (Vol. 1); Martha Minow, 
“Between vengeance and forgiveness: South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission,” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 
14, No. 4 (1998) p. 319-355; Andrew Rigby, Justice and reconciliation: After the violence (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001); Rotberg, R.I. and Thompson, D. eds., Truth v. justice: The morality of truth commissions (Princeton University 
Press, 2010) 
187 Rotberg and Thompson, Truth v Justice, p. 127;  
188 Ibid. Moreover, studies by Borer, Hayner and Olsen et al have assessed truth commissions’ ability to achieve their 
stated aims of social healing, reconciliation, ‘peace-building’, or the extent to which they can improve human rights 




Dr Alex Boraine who was both one of the TRC’s key masterminds,189 as well as its deputy 
Chairperson, described the TRC as a “third way” in the field of transitional justice, 
combining the ‘truth-seeking’ of the Latin American truth commission model with the 
retributive threat of criminal prosecutions in its novel conditional amnesty setup.190 
However, as was argued in section 2.3 above, the TRC actually shared many characteristic 
features with ‘Tumult Commissions’ (Royal Commissions or Commonwealth 
Commissions of inquiry).These were used by the British colonial government and 
subsequently also by the Apartheid regime specifically to legitimate injustice and 
untruths. As Sitze asks, “what does it mean that one can find so many of the defining 
attributes of the TRC operating under conditions defined not by democratic transition but 
by colonial and even Apartheid governments?”191 When viewed genealogically, was the 
TRC a ‘break’ with the former regime, or rather an attempt to use the “master’s tools” to 
“dismantle the master’s house?”192 How was the TRC’s ‘truth-seeking’ role different to the 
‘Grand Tradition’ commissions of inquiry that told the “truth of state”? Can one not 
compare the TRC’s use of amnesty with the class indemnities of martial law, or with 
Apartheid’s indemnity laws that prevented state agents from being held accountable for 
politically motivated violence? With political violence being the object of inquiry, the 
                                                          
accountability or impunity”, but that truth commissions can assist in improving human rights by “fortifying the 
balance” between accountability and impunity”, p. 469 (Olsen, T.D., Payne, L.A., Reiter, A.G. and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
E., 2010. “When truth commissions improve human rights”. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4(3), 
pp.457-476). See also Borer, T.A., 2006. Telling the truths: Truth telling and peace building in post-conflict societies. 
Univ of Notre Dame Pr. 
189 For a detailed insider account of Boraine’s personal involvement in initiating the idea of a TRC in South Africa see 
Boraine,  A Country Unmasked, Cape Town and Oxford, 2001. 
190Alex Boraine. "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way." In Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions, R Rotberg and D Thompson (Eds), (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 141-57 
191Sitze, The Impossible Machine, p. 191 





question remains: to what extent could the TRC be considered as yet another ‘Tumult 
Commission’ that whitewashed state massacres via discursive strategies that promoted 
‘truth’, reconciliation and healing?193 These questions are abstract, and require critical 
interrogation to understand the legacy left by the TRC and its impact on post-Apartheid 
South Africa’s Marikana Commission of Inquiry. As noted by transitional justice expert 
Neil Kritz, one of the main challenges of truth and accountability faced by transitional 
societies is how “to strike the proper balance between a whitewash [of past political 
violence] on the one hand and a witch hunt on the other”.194 
This chapter takes a critical approach to the TRC viewed within the context and 
chronology of commissions of inquiry using the conceptual distinction of ‘fact-finding’, 
‘truth-seeking’ and the pragmatic functions of official discourse and practice developed in 
Chapter Two. Through a critical consideration of the TRC’s relation to civil society, it 
builds on the differentiated notion of “truth-telling” using the analytical distinction of 
speaking truth with and to power, as well as that between ‘truth as knowledge’ and ‘truth 
as acknowledgment’. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of all aspects, or 
to evaluate the ‘success’ of the TRC as a transitional justice tool, but to raise some 
significant issues that standard accounts of transitional justice, with a narrow focus on 
perpetrators and victims of past human rights violations, tend to miss.  
                                                          
193 See Annelies Verdoolaege, Reconciliation discourse: The case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (John 
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4.2 The TRC’s Inception: A Public Call for ‘Truth’ 
Chapters Two and Three explained that commissions of inquiry use public settings and 
processes to authorise official discourse on a period of state violence. Ashforth specifically 
highlighted the legitimating function of colonial and post-colonial commissions of 
inquiry, emphasizing the ‘schemes of legitimation’ involved in the symbolic ritual of the 
commission’s proceedings.195 He also noted that commissions of inquiry are state-led 
initiatives set up in response to a ‘crisis’ for which it seeks a ‘solution’. However the TRC 
was set up by a different kind of process to any other official commission of inquiry in 
South Africa. Whilst its origins are usually located in the elite-led constitutional 
negotiations, the desire for an official truth project was not shared by political elites and 
actually came from civil society.196 This detail placed the TRC in a complex position in 
relation to the state on the one hand and civil society on the other.  
4.2.1 The Postamble to the Interim Constitution: “There Shall Be Amnesty” 
The TRC’s immediate political context was a negotiated settlement reflected in South 
Africa’s Interim Constitution.197 This settlement precluded the possibility of criminal 
prosecutions modelled on the retributive-style transitional justice of Nuremburg, but 
                                                          
195 Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation”, 6 
196 The relationship between the TRC and the newly elected ANC government was not stable. In his personal memoir, 
Alex Boraine reflected on the favourable conditions within which the TRC operated - one of which was the “strong 
support” the TRC received from the Government under the “powerful leadership” of President Nelson Mandela. As 
the TRC process progressed, however, it faced increasing opposition from multiple groups including the ANC. Alex 
Boraine, A Life in Transition, p. 199 
197 ‘Transitologists’ agree that the type of transition that a former authoritarian state undergoes will impact on the 
nature of the transitional justice mechanism that is adopted by the newly democratic state and reflects the balance 
of power between political groups. See Huntington, S.P., 1993. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth 
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of power. Chapman and Ball,  “Levels of Truth: Macro Truth and the TRC”, in: A Chapman and H Van der Merwe 




rather contained an “implicit and explicit pact on the need for amnesty.”198 In analysing 
the ‘truth-seeking’ function of the TRC it is necessary to situate this in the context of the 
protracted struggle against the Apartheid regime, which had in effect led to a military 
stalemate and prompted elite-led negotiations. As Minister of Justice Dullah Omar stated 
at the time,  
“if we did not agree to the ‘postamble’, which made provision for amnesty, there 
would have been no negotiated settlement in our country. The government of the 
day and the National Party, in particular, would not have agreed to democratic 
elections and the introduction of this democratic constitution without making 
provision for amnesty…[The] idea was ultimately accepted, that a perpetrator 
cannot excuse himself or herself for a crime   committed and that only under a 
democratic dispensation can the question of amnesty be handled… You must locate 
the question of amnesty within the context of total settlement in our country. If 
you discuss it separately, you get a false picture of reality and the choices which 
faced our country.”199 
Clearly, an amnesty agreement was the sine qua non of the negotiated settlement. This 
suggests that both sides of the ‘elite’ pact-makers agreed on amnesty as a prerequisite for 
settlement and hence of the ‘peaceful’ transition. Significantly, though, this agreement 
did not include provision for a truth commission. Indeed, the amnesty provision in the 
‘postamble’ contains no specific requirement for the disclosure of ‘truth’. As André du Toit 
has noted, the discourse that framed the Postamble included “seminal formulations on 
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‘peace’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘ubuntu’ that were subsequently also 
incorporated into the Preamble of the Final Constitution and the TRC Act; however, 
crucially, there was no commensurate reference to the imperative of ‘truth’ in the official 
discourse that narrated the new South Africa nation into being.200 
References to a ‘need for truth’ were rather articulated in public discourse and by human 
rights movements within civil society. In the early 1990s, increasing disclosures began to 
leak into the public sphere concerning covert crimes, including killings and acts of torture, 
committed by state functionaries in ‘death squads’ at the now infamous Vlakplaas. These 
became linked to unresolved cases of political assassinations and reports on the counter-
insurgency tactics of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) carried out by SADF Special 
Intelligence. Moreover, soon after the unbanning of the major anti-Apartheid 
organisations – the ANC, PAC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – a 
number of allegations arose concerning the ANC’s own violent disciplinary tactics within 
its training camps in Angola, Tanzania and other areas of Southern Africa in the early 
1980s. Reports appeared of the use of necklace murders by ANC-aligned political forces 
among civilians in townships and events like the Boipatong Massacre.201 These 
disclosures prompted widespread response by distinct civil society groups and individuals 
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who began to express both the need for, and the right to, truth concerning past 
violence.202 A general amnesty, as had been proposed by the elite political pacts would 
have erased all traces of past crimes from the official historical record, including the 
crimes committed by the Apartheid state agents, but also those of the liberation 
movements.  
The ANC responded to the allegations by establishing its own set of internal ‘fact-finding’ 
inquiries to investigate the claims -- the Stuart, the Skweyiya, and the Motsuenyane 
Commissions of Inquiry.203 These commissions, the Motsuenyane Commission in 
particular, were relatively successful in their ‘truth-recovery’ process confirming that 
human rights abuses such as detention, torture and extra-judicial executions were carried 
out by the organisation in exile.204 However, importantly, these commissions were 
unofficial truth projects. Therefore - to invoke Nagel’s useful distinction - although they 
were able to uncover knowledge concerning abuses that occurred at the training camps, 
they did not achieve official and appropriate acknowledgment of those atrocities. 
Nonetheless, they had impact. The various internal reports of these Commissions resulted 
in major divisions at the ANC’s National Executive Council (NEC) meeting in August 
1993.205  By way of a compromise aimed at resolving these internal divisions Kader Asmal 
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proposed the need for a national Truth Commission, “or Commission of Inquiry” to 
investigate human rights abuses committed on both sides of the conflict.206 He outlined 
the ‘benefits’ of a truth commission in the South African context as follows: 
“The most important reason for the establishment of such a commission is to get 
to the truth. The experience of Chile, Argentina and El Salvador keenly reflects the 
cleaning power of the truth. Thousands of people who gave evidence rarely, if ever, 
showed a desire for vengeance. What mattered most was that the memory of their 
loved ones would not be denigrated or forgotten and that such terrible things 
would never happen again.”207 
However, apart from individuals like Asmal, Albie Sachs and a few other human rights 
activists there was no sustained ANC support for the truth commission proposal. Others 
advocated that because of the level of atrocity committed on both sides of the conflict it 
would be in the interest of all to apply a general amnesty and put the past to rest.  
From a human rights perspective, a general amnesty is problematic as it provides 
unqualified immunities to the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses.208 This would 
have rendered any possibility of holding perpetrators accountable void. As an additional 
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effect, blanket amnesty would have closed the books on the possibility of ‘truth’ regarding 
human rights violations committed during Apartheid.209 
A series of workshops and conferences hosted by IDASA made a significant contribution 
to the conceptualisation of the TRC and lobbying for the drafting of the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation (PNUR) Act (No. 34 of 1995).210 The draft legislation 
of the PNUR Act was based on approximately 150 hours of public hearings in January 
1995 where numerous civil society groups, NGOs and religious, mental health and human 
rights groups made representations.211 It was during this period that the two (conflicting) 
objectives of amnesty, and a public truth process were fused in the idea of “conditional 
amnesty”, or the truth-for-amnesty compromise.212 This challenges the assumption that 
the TRC’s inception was directly linked to the ‘Postamble’. The earliest draft legislation by 
the Department of Justice in 1994 was for an Amnesty Commission, and not a Truth 
Commission. It seems that ‘truth’ was not a priority for the political elites that negotiated 
the architecture of South Africa’s new democracy. Had this been the case, the TRC, as an 
official commission of inquiry, would have been comparable to Ashforth’s notion of the 
‘Grand Tradition’ that addressed problems of racial strife through its investigative ritual. 
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The difference with the TRC is that calls for the ‘truth’ concerning past political violence 
came from initiatives led by civil society and human rights organisations. This 
overwhelming public desire for truth inspired the inclusive process by which the founding 
legislation for the TRC was imagined and subsequently brought to life.213 
Although there was a popular will for the truth commission, it was also necessary that it 
be an official commission. Sufficient popular will and capability might have been able to 
set up an unofficial truth project guided by the religious communities, for instance. 
However, it was vital to the TRC, as a transitional institution, that it be an official 
commission to assist in legitimating the new democratic government. A civil-society 
driven commission may have been similarly committed to unearthing certain knowledge 
concerning past instances of human rights abuses; however it would not have had the 
same access or the means and resources of an official commission in attaining truth as 
‘official acknowledgement’ of those past acts. Nor would it have engaged in the requisite 
measure of self-reflection by the South African state to assure the public that state-
sanctioned violence of Apartheid’s proportion would never happen again. At the same 
time, the TRC was not entirely part of the regular state apparatus as it was an independent 
commission set up to exist for a finite period of time, unlike more permanent institutions 
like the Human Rights Commission.214 The result was that the TRC had a complex 
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position in relation to both the state and society and moreover, made for a complex 
situation in which it sought to both accommodate and legitimate multiple forms of truth.  
4.2.2 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation (PNUR) Act’s Impact 
on the TRC’s ‘truth-seeking’ mandate 
The PNUR Act prescribed two distinct types of inquiries in so far as it pertained to the 
question of gross human rights violations: 
(a) Was a gross violation of human rights committed and what was the identity of the 
victim?215 
(b) What was the identity of those involved in such violations and what was their 
accountability for such violations?216 
The TRC’s interpretation of this mandate was that (a) was strictly a factual question 
relating to victims of individual violations of human rights. The PNUR defined a gross 
human rights violation as killing, torture, severe ill-treatment, such as attempted killing 
and extreme bodily and/or mental harm inflicted; abduction, such as someone being 
forcibly or illegally “taken away”.217 According to the TRC, the factual question whether a 
gross violation had been committed on an identifiable victim did not include questions of 
accountability of the perpetrator(s). It stated “The question of whether the conduct of the 
perpetrator is justified is irrelevant”.218 The rationale for this was to allow for a greater 
number of victims to “benefit from the Commission’s process”.219 (b), on the other hand, 
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was interpreted as involving more complex and “technical” issues determining 
accountability.220 As the report states, 
“Findings emerging at this level of enquiry may have grave implications and 
impinge upon the fundamental rights of alleged perpetrators. This enquiry 
involves, therefore, both factual and legal questions.”221 
This placed the TRC in a complex situation in relation to its ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-
seeking’ mandate. On the one hand it was to fulfil the generic function of a ‘fact-finding’ 
commission of inquiry identifying individual victims of gross human rights violations as 
defined by the PNUR Act. Making findings of this kind relies on some measure of 
verification through research. On the other hand it was required to make findings of legal 
accountability in its perpetrator findings. As stated in Chapter Two, making legal findings, 
or pursuing ‘judicial truth’, requires that rules of due process are observed. The 
implication is that two different methods of inquiry were necessary to fulfil this dual 
mandate. The Commission resolved that it could “find that a gross human rights violation 
had been committed because there was a victim of that violation. It had, however, to apply 
a more stringent test in order to hold a perpetrator accountable for that violation.”222 The 
result was the need for two very different truth-recovery processes in the TRC’s 
proceedings. These were, broadly speaking, a victim-centred truth process; and a 
perpetrator-centred one, encompassing the Amnesty hearings.   
Consequently, the TRC developed an ambiguous status as a truth and reconciliation 
commission seeking victim-centred truth while also functioning as a generic fact-finding 
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commission of inquiry; it was mandated to compile an official historical record of 
Apartheid’s political crimes but also to make quasi-judicial perpetrator findings. As 
Graeme Simpson stated, this established its “own dual role as a fact-finding, quasi-
judicial enterprise obsessed with forensic truth and verifiable information on the one 
hand, and a psychologically sensitive mechanism for victim storytelling and ‘healing’ on 
the other.”223 The following section shall unpack some ways in which this affected the 
TRC’s ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’, while contributing to its narrative and 
legitimating functions. 
4.3 Towards an understanding of the TRC’s ‘truth-seeking’ with 
regards to past acts of political violence 
As stated, the TRC was set up by the PNUR Act and not in terms of the Commissions Act 
of 1947. However, key elements of its modus operandi may be traced to the influence of 
the Commonwealth Inquiry tradition or other official commissions, like the Wessels 
Commission. Consequently the TRC borrowed its ‘truth-seeking’ practices from both 
Commonwealth Commissions and Latin American truth commissions, whilst also sharing 
some of the former’s typical limitations. Like Commonwealth Commissions it adopted 
powers of search and seizure, summons and subpoena. Its founding legislation also 
contained provisions that enabled both public and in camera hearings, a standard practice 
in the history of Commonwealth Commissions. However, the TRC also adopted the 
‘victim-centred’ features of the Latin American truth commissions, including broad 
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consultation with society in the appointment of commissioners, as well as mechanisms to 
provide victim-support and enforce certain obligations on government with regards to the 
findings of the report.224 
4.3.1 The TRC’s victim-centred ‘truth-seeking’ process 
In many ways the pursuit of ‘victim-centred’ truth became the hallmark of the TRC’s work. 
Hearings were televised so that the entire nation could watch the emotionally-charged 
scenes where family members of deceased victims faced perpetrators, imploring them to 
explain why they had done what they did. Individuals recounted gruelling scenes of 
torture suffered at the hands of state security forces; stories of pain, survival and 
resistance. Compared to the earlier Latin American truth commissions, where hearings 
took place in camera, the TRC was extraordinarily public and this public nature is one of 
the features that afforded it the label of a ‘unique’ and ‘model’ tool of transitional justice. 
However, the public hearings are less novel when viewed within the tradition of 
Commonwealth Commissions and the later South African commissions of inquiry, such 
as the ‘Tumult Commissions’. As explained in previous chapters, the public hearings 
formed an integral part of the ‘Grand Tradition’ and functioned significantly in tumult 
commissions’ ‘legitimating schemes’. Drawing upon legal discourses and procedures 
enabled the authorisation of findings as ‘objective fact’. ‘Official discourse’ and ‘legal 
discourse’ functioned to legitimate both the work of the commission itself, and 
concomitantly the state that authorised it. These procedural schemes and its official status 
allowed a commission to speak truth with ‘power, which can be linked to what Ashforth 
calls the ‘Truth of State’. To what extent was TRC’s ‘truth-seeking’ different from this?  
                                                          




First, public hearings provided victims and survivors the opportunity to recount their 
story in front of an audience. According to Hayner, the public nature can “even 
symbolically offer an apology for past wrongs”.225 For Freeman, the public hearing 
component in contemporary truth commissions actually has less of a truth-seeking (or 
fact-finding) function than what appears, as those who testify will have already engaged 
in a process of statement-taking prior to being chosen to give testimony.226 Therefore, the 
public hearing process is a tool to “publicise the truth”, or “make a similar statement on a 
public stage”.227 Boraine’s account of the victims’ hearings emphasizes the symbolic effect 
identified by Hayner and the performance aspect identified by Freeman: 
“The ritual, which is what the public hearings were, which promised truth, healing 
and reconciliation to a deeply divided and traumatized people, began with a story. 
This was the secret of the commission – no stern-faced officials sitting in a private 
chamber, but a stage… The audience was there too, and a much wider audience 
watched and listened through television and radio. It was a ritual, deeply needed 
to cleanse a nation. It was drama… But this was no brilliantly written play; it was 
the unvarnished truth in all its starkness.”228 
The accounts by Hayner, Freeman and Boraine all echo Ashforth’s assertion that 
commissions of inquiry offer symbolic rituals that enact a particular ‘truth’, or official 
discourse on a subject. However, whilst the ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions of inquiry 
and ‘Tumult Commissions’ drew on rituals of court-room proceedings, utilising cross-
examination or the presence of experts or lawyers to verify ‘truth’ as objective fact, 
Boraine’s description of the TRC’s public hearings implies a ritual of a different kind. 
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Significantly there were no ‘stern-faced officials’ that could challenge the ‘story’ as told by 
the victim. Rather, the hearings provided a ‘stage’ giving the victim a further opportunity 
for ‘truth-telling’ that won’t be challenged. Moreover, the discourse in this context 
resonated with a religious, particularly Christian, narrative associated with baptism (i.e. 
that mankind is born with original sin and needs to be cleansed) serving to ‘cleanse’ the 
nation of past sin. The public hearing space created a fertile environment for the 
overarching discourse of forgiveness, reconciliation, catharsis and healing to take hold, 
often imbued heavily with religious overtones.229 The very notion of catharsis – a word 
often used in connection with the ‘truth-telling’ that occurred at the commission – 
denotes a spiritual renewal, where personal confessions became analogies for the wider 
process of social and political transformation and renewal. 
On a separate, but related issue, the TRC to some extent allowed victims and survivors, 
and not only the functionaries of the state, to speak truth with power. For Gready, this is 
a critical distinction between generic commissions of inquiry that speak truth with power, 
and truth commissions that provide victims and survivors an opportunity to speak truth 
to power.  
“While one cross-cutting source of legitimacy – objectivity – allies their work with 
that of state inquiries, another marks a departure: human rights activists seek both 
to legitimise their own activities and to legitimise or delegitimise state practice 
with reference to international human rights law. This marks a parting of the ways 
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with state inquiries as, rather than speaking truth with power, it often demands 
the more strident function of speaking truth to power, specifically state power”.230 
Gready further asserts that the TRC, as an official truth commission, undertook a 
“complex balancing act, speaking truth both with and to power”.231 The “complex 
balancing act” was derived from the fact that the TRC was an official commission but not 
entirely part and parcel of the state, while its mandate effectively derived from input by 
civil society.  
4.3.2 ‘Truth’ as a means to transitional justice 
Conceived as a transitional justice instrument the TRC’s public ‘truth-seeking’ process 
had consequentialist aims that went beyond ‘fact-finding’. Establishing the ‘truth’ about 
past human rights violations was conceived as means to achieve the broader aim of 
national unity and reconciliation, as made evident by the very title of the PNUR Act. In 
the same way the TRC was also concerned with restoring the rule of law, enhancing 
respect for human rights as well as restoring moral order. This logic is summed up by the 
Chairperson Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the following extract from the TRC Report: 
“In our case, dealing with the past means knowing what happened. Who ordered 
that this person should be killed? Why did this gross violation of human rights take 
place? We also need to know about the past so that we can renew our resolve and 
commitment that never again will such violations take place. We need to know 
about the past in order to establish a culture of respect for human rights. It is only 
by accounting for the past that we can become accountable for the future.”232 
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This statement implies some form of causal link between acknowledging past political 
crimes, and the prevention of the reoccurrence of such acts occurring in a nation’s 
future.233 This is familiar theme of contemporary human rights discourse. As Richard 
Goldstone, the former chief prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR noted, “the only hope of 
breaking cycles of violence is by public acknowledgement of such violence and the 
exposure of those responsible for it.”234 
The task of transitional justice bodies is also typically conceived in terms of having to 
(re)define a moral standard where that standard had been manipulated, or lost altogether. 
As Wilmot James asserted during early discussions on the TRC, 
“To me it marks a moral shift between a past and a future. It is desirable to 
introduce a range of values, procedures and mechanisms in a wide variety of areas 
of society that make the announcement of this break with the past a democratic 
one. The idea of having a commission of truth and of looking at questions of 
corrective justice is part of that”.235 
Hence, the TRC’s public truth process was conceived as a means towards transitional 
justice. This entailed the deliberate confrontation of past acts of political violence, rather 
than justifying them. It also implies that divulging the ‘facts’ of past human rights 
violations had a transformative agenda. The idea was that ‘truth’ would enable societal 
                                                          
233Similarly, Chilean human rights advocate José Zalaquett argued that a nation’s unity “depends on a shared 
identity, which in turn depends largely on shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of healthy social catharsis 
and helps to prevent the past from reoccurring.” Zalaquett, José. 1995, "Balancing ethical imperatives and political 
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transformation. However, the TRC’s status as a commission of inquiry that sought 
objectively verifiable facts into gross human rights violations, appears to have 
undermined the possibility of substantive social transformation.  
4.4 Objective fact-finding and ‘bureaucratic truth production’ in the 
TRC’s Report: A legitimating scheme? 
The previous section set out some of the victim-centred ‘truth-finding’ objectives of the 
TRC that were framed by the various objectives of ‘truth’, ‘corrective’ (transitional) justice, 
reconciliation and national catharsis. This section looks towards the TRC’s actual 
practices for determining truth which were complex and changed over time. 
The eventual report distinguished between four types of truth. These were, factual or 
forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; social or dialogue truth and healing or 
restorative truth.236 The differences between these different types of truth remained 
conceptually unclear. One might surmise that the victims’ hearings -- part of the 
systematic effort to provide a public platform for victim ‘truth telling’ as integral to the 
national aim of ‘dealing with the past’ -- was related to the notion of personal or narrative 
truth. As stated previously, the TRC understood that these ‘truths’ were not considered 
appropriate to meet the due process requirements that perpetrator findings would 
necessitate. The ‘social or dialogue truth’ and ‘healing or restorative truth’ appear related 
to communal reconciliation or initiatives where the ‘truth’ that emerged was to facilitate 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This can be linked to the notion of ‘truth 
                                                          




as acknowledgment’.237 As Deborah Posel stated, ‘factual’ truths were identified as that 
type of truth which is not concerned with acknowledging the subjective experience of 
individuals or with divulging personal narratives.238 The implication is that ‘factual truths’ 
were seen as neutral, or ‘objective’.239 However, the arguments by Buur, Wilson and 
Mamdani below suggest that the TRC’s ‘factual truth’ was far from neutral or objective. It 
appears that the TRC attempted to legitimate the ‘personal’ and ‘narrative’ truths of 
victims’ testimonies by framing its proceedings and final report in the official discourse 
of human rights, and reconciliation. However, by doing so, the TRC was self-limiting in 
its definition of ‘factual truth’ as contained within the controlled vocabulary of ‘gross 
human rights violations’. 
Buur argued that the TRC’s public hearings, and final report produced ritualised public 
representations of the past that cannot be divorced from the environment of on-stage 
truth telling and ‘bureaucratic truth’ production within which they were framed.240 The 
TRC’s database and information management system was based on a design developed 
by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and planned the way the 
TRC would operate in detail. As Buur noted, 
                                                          
237 “It is in this context that the role of ‘acknowledgement’ must be emphasised. Acknowledgement refers to placing 
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victims”, TRC Report, Vol 1, Chapter 5, Section 45. 
238 Deborah Posel, “The TRC Report: What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth”” in Commissioning the Past: 
Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2002), 
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to a scientific or forensic investigation. 
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“In order to get the right information for the database, an extensive and elaborate 
information management system was set up…. It had outlined staff structure, the 
qualifications necessary for each position, the internal organization of the 
commission, how the truth of the past should be collected and how it could be 
represented.”241 
This information management system had a decisive impact on the structure of the 
commission’s work, as well as on the nature of the findings published in the final report.242 
Buur further argued that the realist and legalistic language of the TRC decontextualized 
and depoliticised the events due to the tendency of the universalistic discourse of human 
rights to strip events of their particular or localised meanings. Richard Wilson likewise 
stressed the decontextualising effects of the TRC’s bureaucratic process of ‘truth 
production’. To quote Wilson directly, “[L]ife becomes text becomes genre”.243 On some 
level, this may have allowed victims to speak truth to power; but as Gready also noted, 
speaking of one’s experience in the language of human rights privileges a liberal, 
universal, legal agenda over personal and local politics.244 The behind-the-scenes 
bureaucratic process of ’truth production’ codified and classified human experience into 
data, or the controlling vocabulary of gross human rights violations.245 This process had 
a decisive impact on the TRC’s findings, which showed the results of a “positivistic human 
rights documentation methodology”.246 
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The TRC thus adopted a conventionally positivist stance to ‘truth-recovery’ in providing 
its empirical overview of Apartheid’s violence. Scholars like Audrey Chapman argued that 
in so doing, the TRC was acting within its mandate.247 However Buur questions the 
assumptions underlying the TRC’s interpretation of its task as defined by the PNUR Act. 
The Act did not actually make specific provision for adherence to a positivistic scientific 
ideal per se, but rather used terms like ‘objectivity’, ‘even-handedness’, and 
‘independence’.248 Buur cites personal conversations with TRC staff members who 
understood this to mean that the TRC should be independent from political influences 
and not ‘take sides’, i.e. to be even-handed.249 However, the TRC rather chose to interpret 
this very general reference to ‘objectivity’ within the Act as designating a positivistic and 
scientific approach to its ‘truth-finding’ task. Why was this the case?  
One reason is that it may have merely been a reflection of the ‘positivist assumptions’ 
inherent in “mainstream social science and law in South Africa”.250 Indeed, viewed in 
isolation this may suffice as a reasonable explanation. However, when viewed within a 
chronology of colonial and post-colonial ‘Tumult Commissions’ inquiring into violence 
against political subjects –which were also official attempts to restore social order, or 
‘peace’ -- the TRC’s turn to a formal conception of ‘truth as objectivity’ is entirely 
consistent with the ‘regime of truth’ in which the ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions of 
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inquiry and indeed ‘Tumult Commissions’ like the Wessels Commission, had operated in 
South Africa. Giving primacy to ‘truth as objectivity’ served a particular scheme of 
legitimation for the TRC. The vindication of victims’ truth through the process of the 
information management system, along with the analyses of researchers and academics, 
served to afford it the status of official historical memory.  
4.5 The ‘truth’ about Apartheid Violence or a whitewashing machine 
avoiding accountability? 
Whilst the TRC acknowledged that it was not a legal body authorised to apportion 
criminal liability;251 a significant portion of the TRC’s work concerned making perpetrator 
findings.252 Unlike most other truth commissions the TRC identified individual 
perpetrators as morally and politically accountable for committing gross violations of 
human rights. There are many arguments concerning the TRC’s amnesty process, which 
cannot be covered in this thesis. The relevant question is how ‘perpetrator findings’ fit 
within the ‘fact-finding’, ‘truth-seeking’ and narrative function of official commissions. 
How did the TRC’s discursive operationalization of ‘amnesty’ within the context of a 
national reconciliation project differ from the narrative functions of the tragic discourse 
of ‘Tumult Commissions’ that whitewashed acts of state violence as legitimate violence? 
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1996. 
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4.5.1 The TRC’s ‘Conditional Amnesty’: “Accountable Amnesty vs Impunity”253 
The legitimating and narrative functions of colonial and Apartheid ‘Tumult Commissions’ 
were explained, by Sitze, as invoking an official ‘tragic discourse’, which was evident as 
the ‘literary’ mode through which colonial officials in the JRC and state functionaries in 
the Wessels Commission “spoke about its officials who killed with impunity”.254 The 
official discourse of those commissions posited the state’s violence as legitimate, as 
opposed to the alleged illegality and illegitimacy of the protest action. Within the 
genealogy of ‘Tumult Ccommissions’ this may be viewed as schemes to rationalise the 
application of amnesty. These schemes were both practical and discursive.  
First, amnesty applications to the TRC had to be individual.255 Amnesty was also justified 
as an ‘amnesty-for-truth’ exchange. It was required that applicants complete an official 
form in which they provided the ‘whole truth’ concerning the specific human rights 
violations they had committed, where full disclosure was a necessary condition for 
consideration. Moreover, applicants had to appear before an amnesty hearing, which was 
open to the public. To qualify, the violation(s) had to have taken place between 1960 and 
1994 and applications had to be submitted between December 1995 and May 1997.256 
Lastly, applicants were only considered for amnesty if the violence could be deemed to be 
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political violence, i.e. if the gross human rights violation had been committed with a 
political objective.257 This framed the TRC’s amnesty as an “accountable amnesty”.  
Sitze provides a compelling interpretation of the TRC’s experiment with ‘truth’ and 
amnesty (or indemnity) setting it apart from ‘Tumult Commissions’. He argues that the 
TRC’s apportioning of amnesty represented a ‘final’ form of indemnity for South Africa. 
The former Apartheid regime had enacted a series of Indemnity Acts protecting state 
officials and members of the defence force ex post facto, for violating laws passed by the 
Apartheid state’s own parliament. For Sitze, the TRC’s operationalization of indemnity 
laws amounted to ‘genius’ as it utilized the very institutions of apartheid-era emergency 
laws as the juridical basis upon which to expose and critique human rights violations 
committed under those emergency laws. 
“The genius of the TRC, more latent than manifest, was to have attempted to 
reiterate a set of manifestly colonial juridical forms as part of an endeavour to 
prescribe a postcolonial political order. It was to have attempted to turn existing 
precedents of state domination back on themselves in order to put those 
precedents to rest”.258 
Similarly Du Bois-Pedain’s analysis of the TRC’s amnesty process concluded that “the 
amnesty provisions in the TRC Act still betray their roots in a long legislative tradition 
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that affords special treatment to (at least some) politically motivated crimes”.259 However 
when used by the TRC and framed within the discourse of ‘accountable amnesty’ it was 
intended to nourish the broader official discourse of national unity and reconciliation. 
Ronald Slye provides a relevant qualifier that I use to distinguish between the indemnity 
of ‘Tumult Commissions’ and the amnesty of the TRC. In an article, Slye asks whether 
‘legitimate amnesty’ is possible.260 He distinguishes different types (amnesiac amnesty, 
compromise and corrective kind) but ultimately argues for “accountable amnesty”, which 
are “amnesties that provide some accountability and more than minimal relief to 
victims”.261 For him, the South African amnesty came closest to qualifying as accountable 
amnesty.  
Moreover, the indemnities that preceded ‘Tumult Commissions’ legitimated state 
violence and rendered the use of violence by rebelling groups of civil society ‘illegitimate’, 
both according to law, but moreover in the official discourse on violence within which 
events were framed. In accordance with Slye’s formulation, it becomes clear that the 
amnesties granted by the TRC were not designed to exculpate agents, nor to support a 
narrative into the necessity of the use of police and military force in suppression. They 
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were focused on exposing and acknowledging human rights abuses, which they did by 
making perpetrator findings on the ANC, as well as on the leaders and agents of the 
Apartheid state. Rather than excusing violence committed with a political objective, the 
TRC stood firm by the principle that gross human rights violations be approached even-
handedly, irrespective of the “justice of the cause” of the various conflicting parties.262 
Therefore, the TRC made perpetrator findings of moral and political responsibility and 
accountability for committing or facilitating gross human rights violations.263 
4.5.2 The TRC within the ‘Grand Tradition’ of Commissions of Inquiry. 
When compared with ‘Grand Tradition’ Commissions of Inquiry, one can begin to identify 
the specific role that the TRC played in legitimating South Africa’s new democratic 
political order. As noted, one particular ‘legitimating scheme’ involved in this process, 
according to Ashforth, was the role of ‘experts’. Specifically he conveys that expert 
testimony was used to validate a ‘scientific’ differentiation of ‘natives’ from ‘non-natives’. 
However, the ‘scientific’, or, neutral findings were hardly neutral, but rather fed into the 
official discourse that served the grander political project of ‘Separate Development’. The 
TRC used similar schemes of legitimation when verifying specific facts on particularly 
violent events in its ‘Event Hearings’. These hearings were used to inquire both into the 
                                                          
262 The TRC’s even-handed approach to making perpetrator findings on the ANC, and the liberation movement was 
highly criticised by the ANC government. Thabo Mbeki claimed that the TRC’s findings were an attempt to 
“delegitimise or criminalise a significant part of the struggle” for liberation, which was framed within the ‘just war’ 
paradigm. See du Toit, “Perpetrator findings as Artificial Even-handedness,” p.32 
263 In addition to the NP leadership, the TRC found that the ANC was “morally and politically accountable for creating 
a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimated when carried out within the broad 
parameters of a ‘people’s war’ as enunciated and actively promoted by the ANC”. TRC Report, Volume 2. Chapter 4, 
Section 97 
Similarly it found that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its leaders “failed to exert the political and moral 
authority available to it to stop such practices… In particular the UDF and its leadership failed to use the full extent 
of such authority to end the practise of necklacing, committed in many instances by its members and supporters. 




‘micro truths’ of the event, but also the ‘macro-truth’ that the event signified, in terms of 
its long term ideological and structural causes: 
“These hearings explored the context in which a specific event occurred and 
typically involved testimony not only from victims but also from alleged 
perpetrators and experts with specific knowledge about the event or issues related 
to it.”264 
Whilst there was little use of ‘experts’ within the proceedings of the public hearings, 
experts were used extensively by the TRC’s research department, in the ‘information 
management system’ and within the TRCs investigative unit.265 The expert input served 
to enable the TRC’s fact-finding operations within its narrowly-defined understanding of 
gross human rights violations.  
However, all findings of ‘fact’ were framed within the overarching discourse of political 
transition, reconciliation and national unity. To reiterate, the South African transition 
was precipitated by an elite-led negotiated settlement and not a social revolution. Hence, 
the terms of the TRC were circumscribed by the Interim Constitution and the PNUR Act, 
which prescribed ‘fact-finding’ into the victims and perpetrators of Apartheid.  Therefore, 
like the ‘Grand Tradition’ commissions, the TRC could only reformulate but not 
fundamentally challenge questions of economic policy, labour and capital control and 
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rather disguised the particular socio-economic and structural violence of Apartheid. 
Mamdani’s critique is illuminating in this regard. For Mamdani the consequence of the 
TRC’s narrow truth based upon the rubric of gross human rights violations led to its 
concealment of what was specific about Apartheid as a crime against humanity within a 
protracted history of conquest and dispossession -- the deprivation of land and 
livelihoods through land laws and the Group Areas Act.266 To use Rosenberg’s distinction, 
the TRC analysed Apartheid’s repression in the context of a ‘regime of criminals’, rather 
than being also a ‘criminal regime’ par excellence.  
In Mamdani’s view the TRC identified a minority of individual perpetrators and victims, 
whilst obscuring the majority of beneficiaries of Apartheid as a system that “defended 
power by denying people rights”.267 When linked to ‘Tumult Commissions’ which 
‘whitewashed’ past events with a more palatable truth, this resonates with the ‘truth’ as 
told by the TRC. Mamdani asks,  
“Imagine that there was a truth commission in the Soviet Union after Stalin, and 
this commissions said nothing about the Gulag. What credibility would it have? 
The South African Gulag was called forced removals. Between 1960 and 1982, an 
estimated 5.3 million people were forcibly removed, their communities shattered, 
their families disposed and their livelihoods destroyed”.268 
In accounting why the TRC had defined its gross human rights violations so narrowly, the 
response is wholly pragmatic. As reported by the TRC,  
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“it became increasingly clear that there would be no value in simply handing the 
government a list which included a broad category of unidentified persons for 
consideration as victims deserving of reparations”.269 
The question that arises is ‘value for whom?’ This may be compared with Ashforth’s 
explanation of the ‘Native Question’ commissions of inquiries schemes of legitimation: 
“Commissions of Inquiry must reconcile knowledge of particular group values 
and ideologies…with knowledge of material objectives and practical possibilities; 
of showing how and what is desirable can be made practical.270 
In the case of official commissions in the context of capitalism, the material objectives are 
necessarily those of state (or powerful capitalist forces supported by the state). In the TRC 
the ‘practical possibilities’ for making binding recommendations that would have enabled 
some measure of distributive justice were constrained by the ‘regime of truth’ within 
which the TRC operated. Consequently the TRC produced a list of individual names of 
victims identified for reparation, but made no reference to communities and groups, 
despite the fact that the ‘truth’ of Apartheid as a crime against humanity, was that it 
targeted, and traumatised, entire groups. The practical effect was that the possibility of 
communities receiving reparations was removed from public discourse entirely, and the 
official line of discourse and action would be individual and symbolic reparations for the 
TRC’s defined victims.271 
This pragmatic discourse is evident in the text of the commission report itself, in the 
section outlining the TRC’s core ‘concepts and principles’.272 
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“The road to reconciliation, therefore, means both material reconstruction and the 
restoration of dignity. It involves the redress of gross inequalities and the nurturing 
of respect for our common humanity. It entails sustainable growth and 
development of the spirit of ubuntu. It implies wide-ranging structural and 
institutional transformation and the healing of broken human relationships. It 
demands guarantees that the past will not be repeated. It requires restitution and 
the restoration of our humanity - as individuals, as communities and as a 
nation.”273 
We may note the ambiguous language that emphasises a narrative of social peace, healing 
and national unity. Terms like ‘material reconstruction’, ‘redress of gross inequalities’, 
and searching for ‘sustainable growth’ and ‘institutional transformation’ linguistically 
steers South Africa’s narrative of transition away from radical economic redistribution 
and towards a vision of ‘closure’. Considering White’s argument on the function of 
narrative genres, one can assert that the grand narrative of national unity and 
reconciliation contained inherent ideological, material and political choices. Of course, 
and as the Marikana Massacre also demonstrated, these choices had direct socio-political 
consequences for the material wealth distribution in post-Apartheid South Africa.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The TRC is by far the most complex of the official truth-seeking institution studied in this 
thesis and this chapter raised a number of critical points regarding the TRC’s inception, 
powers and its ambivalent ‘fact-finding’ and ‘truth-seeking’ mandate. The chapter could 
not and did not attempt to provide a critique of the TRC as a model of transitional justice, 
nor did it evaluate the truth or falsity of its findings per se. Rather, revealing the place of 
                                                          





the TRC within the chronology and context of Royal and Commonwealth Commissions 
showed striking similarities with the TRC, despite the different contexts in which they 
emerged.  
This particular analytical lens enabled a critical review of the underlying and operative 
conceptions of ‘truth’ as they were actualised in the TRC’s work, including the implicit 
assumptions and implications of its bureaucratic truth production methodology. Citing 
the TRC report itself as well as some of its key architects suggests that the TRC’s operative 
notion of truth was drawn from Nagel’s ‘truth as acknowledgement’ as it began with a 
focus on victim truth-telling as a means to achieve recognition, transitional justice and 
reconciliation.  However, the final report suggests a different fixation. The final report 
reflects the consequences of a technical information management system, presented as 
the factual truth of Apartheid’s abuses. In congruence with the function of ‘grand 
tradition’ commissions, the TRC’s official discourse of Apartheid violence depoliticised 
and reconceptualised contentious issues by applying a totalising narrative order to the 
period under investigation.  
In Chapter One I cited Alex Boraine, who stated that transitional justice fills a liminal 
space in transitional societies, in which the “old order is dying but … the new order has 
not yet been born.”274 It is in fact an optimistic reformulation of Antonio Gramsci’s 
assertion made in his Prison Notebooks, “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the 
old is dying and the new cannot be born.”275 As an institution designed to mark a ‘new’ 
democratic society, the TRC’s main catalyst – the decision that there would be amnesty –
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was rooted in the ‘old’, colonial practise that indemnified and legitimated state violence 
enacted with ‘political motive’. However, spoken in the ‘official discourse’ of ‘accountable 
amnesty’ indemnity functioned to expose the ‘truth’ of perpetrators’ crimes, and hence 
partition South Africa’s constitutional democracy from Apartheid’s parliamentary 
sovereignty. In this sense, the TRC was simultaneously revolutionary and reformist 
It is evident that the TRC attempted to go beyond the ‘fact-finding’ role of general 
commissions of inquiry and it was influential in entrenching a discourse and praxis 
centred on ‘truth-seeking’ for the overall purposes of reconciliation and nation-building 
when powerful members of society had opted for amnesty. However, the status and 
function of the TRC as an official commission of inquiry whose mandate came primarily 
from civil society made for a complicated institution. Compared to Ashforth’s Grand 
Tradition  in which commissions spoke the official ‘truth of power’; the TRC attempted to 
speak truth both with the power of the new democratic state (to and about Apartheid’s 
victims and perpetrators) but also attempted to speak truth to the former Apartheid state, 
as well as to the democratic ANC government. This constituted the amalgamation of a 
range of various forces, where on the one hand its official discourse and practise was 
geared towards a religious and therapeutic narrative of catharsis and social reconciliation, 
whilst on the other hand it involved quasi-judicial legal discourse in determining 
’objective’ truth and making perpetrator findings in the final report.  
Hence, on the one hand the TRC was a game changer in the way it facilitated public truth-
telling for victims of gross human rights violations in a way never seen in the ‘Native 
Question’ and ‘Tumult Commissions’. However, when that was combined with its 




on the fact that the TRC was not a court of law. However, to avoid being a ‘whitewashing 
machine’, it sought to make even-handed, yet determinate findings of accountability and 
responsibility for crimes of gross violations of human rights.  
Nonetheless, the meaning of these findings was, and remains ambiguous. As an 
investigative body and not a legal tribunal, how appropriate was it for the TRC to make 
findings of political accountability, and responsibility? The TRC acknowledged that 
making perpetrator findings required a more ‘stringent test’; however, it is not clear what 
the TRC understood this ‘test’ to be. It appears that the TRC defaulted to the legitimating 
schemes of both the ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions of inquiry and ‘Tumult 
Commissions’ using the ‘proper decorum’ of the court of law. However, it was also not 
clear what the relationship was between the TRC’s perpetrator findings to the amnesty 
process on the one hand, and to the courts on the other. In effect, the ‘truth’ produced by 
the TRC raises far more questions regarding the actual role, status and function of official 
truth-seeking commissions, than it provides closure.  
In a recent conversation I had with Adam Ashforth, he wrote “the TRC is certainly in the 
Grand Tradition, possibly the grandest”. The failure of the TRC to devise a satisfactory 
scheme of legitimation was related to the fact that, with the advent of democracy, it was 
no longer necessary for the state to find a way of speaking of, for, and to ’the 
Natives/Bantu/Blacks...’ since genuine politics had arrived.276 It appears that twenty-two 
years into an ANC-led democratic government, the state still struggles to reconcile 
                                                          




participatory democratic politics with an appropriate scheme of legitimation in the 






Chapter 5: Conclusion of Thesis 
 
“It is … true that every new movement, when it first elaborates its theory and policy, begins by 
finding support in the preceding movement, though it may be in direct contradiction with the 
latter. It begins by suiting itself to the forms found at hand and by speaking the language spoken 
hereto. In time the new grain breaks through the old husk. The new movement finds its forms 
and its own language.” – Rosa Luxemburg277 
5.1 Revisiting the problem statement 
This thesis began by problematising the proclaimed aims of the Marikana Commission of 
inquiry -- attaining ‘truth’, ‘justice’, and ‘healing’ -- both in terms of its mandate as well 
as its legal status as a generic commission of inquiry, and not a court of law or a truth 
commission. An analysis of commissions of inquiry in South Africa similarly 
problematised their use as official means to devise authoritative ‘solutions’ to particular 
‘problems’ of governance by engaging in a seemingly ’objective’ inquiry whose findings 
were not neutral but guided by certain ‘truth regimes’.  
The word ‘tumult’ denotes a state of dire confusion, or disorder – the opposite of ‘peace’. 
In a sense, each commission considered in this thesis constituted an official attempt to 
seek the ‘truth’ in order to restore social order, or [relative] ‘peace’ after a tumultuous 
event or period of history in which the internal contradictions of an unjust social order 
became untenable and led to rebellion or, to use Hegel’s analogy, a ‘struggle to the death’ 
of the most corporeal kind. In these contexts, one may agree with Gready that ‘truth’ 
becomes a narrative genre encompassing the work and reporting of state commissions of 
                                                          





inquiry as well as that of historical commissions and truth commissions.278 Often the 
prescribed ‘solutions’ identified tended to obscure rather than reveal the underlying 
truths that were the root cause of the social disturbance – an inherently unequal and 
unjust social order. The specific problem posed by the thesis as its research questions 
were: 
What are the various functions of official, “truth-seeking” commissions of inquiry in 
South Africa, from Sharpeville (1960) to the TRC (1995-2002), to Marikana (2012)? 
What are the main issues associated with official ‘truth-seeking’ when official discourse 
legitimates political violence? 
These research questions were explored using an analytical framework that 
problematised the notion of ‘official truth-seeking’ following state-sanctioned political 
violence. The complexity of the relationship between ‘truth’ and (state) power in official 
truth-seeking institutions was indicated by distinguishing speaking ‘truth with power’ 
and speaking ‘truth to power’, as well as through the distinction between truth as 
knowledge, and truth as acknowledgement.  I also introduced the distinction between the 
various functions of official commissions as: 
a) Objective fact-finding, in accordance with the basic mandate of generic commissions of 
inquiry; 
b) Official truth-seeking, as a distinctive claim of dedicated investigations of state violence 
(i.e. as seen in historical commissions, tumult commissions and truth commissions); and 
                                                          




c) The legitimating function of the official discourse of commissions of inquiry and the 
associated narrative genres (e.g. ‘forensic discourse’, ‘tragic discourse’, ‘legal discourse’ 
and ‘reconciliation discourse’).  
It was shown that official investigative commissions exhibit inherent problems when they 
also made determinate findings into the responsibility of certain actors for unlawful, or 
extrajudicial killing. A further paradox lies in the discourse of tragedy that effectively 
exonerates perpetrators by legitimating the use of force inflicted by state security forces, 
whilst delegitimising civil protest and resistance. The TRC proved to be a qualitatively 
different institution as it sought to disclose and delegitimise human rights violations 
indiscriminately by exposing the truth as a means toward transitional justice. The TRC 
also sought to expose the limits of justifications of political violence by its even-handed 
identification of perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Nonetheless, as a 
commission of inquiry, the legal status of the perpetrator findings were unclear and there 
did not seem to be sufficient political will to follow up on the cases of perpetrators who 
were denied amnesty, or failed to apply.  
Moreover, the latent ‘truth’ considered to be outside the realm of official inquiry were 
violations of socio-economic rights.  This is not to say that the TRC did not take account 
of their significance. To the contrary, the TRC did recommend a range of structural and 
institutional reforms with careful detail spanning from land reform, justice, safety and 
security and police reform. However the TRC’s official discourse on apartheid’s violence 
limited its focus to the ‘gross violations’. Since the publication of the TRC’s findings there 




Colin Bundy suggests the effect that this discourse had on the way South Africans have 
come to think about what is legitimate in society.  
“The TRC could not come to terms with the underlying structures and processes 
that have determined our identities and patterned our society. Because of its 
mandate, we may run the risk of defining a new order as one in which police may 
no longer enjoy immunity to torture opponents of the government, but fail to 
specify that ordinary citizens should not be poor and illiterate and powerless, or be 
pushed around by state officials and employers.279 
Hence, it has also been suggested that the Marikana ‘tragedy’ may be seen as a 
consequence of the ANC government ignoring the recommendations that the TRC put 
forward.280 
5.2 The Marikana Commission investigating the ‘truth’  
For Michael Bishop, the Marikana Commission “was always about more than fact-
finding”.281 He cites the commission’s motto ‘Truth, Restoration and Justice’.  It was this 
motto that incited the initial questions that set this thesis in motion. In what capacity 
could the Marikana Commission make claims to official ‘truth’, ‘restoration’ and ‘justice’? 
As stated in the introduction, the Marikana Commission was set up as a regular ‘fact-
finding’ commission, as provided by the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1947,282 tasked to 
investigate “the tragic incidents” at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana with a view to making 
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recommendations of criminal and civil liability.283 It could also refer a matter for further 
prosecution or investigation.284 The Commission was split into two phases: phase one was 
to deal with what Chapman and Ball called the ‘micro truth’ – specifically the week that 
led up to the 16th August 2012. Phase Two was to investigate the ‘macro truth’ – the long 
term causes such as the migrant labour system, the role of the mining sector and the 
broader implications of the relationship between the state, labour and mining capital.285 
What was set up as an ‘event-specific’ commission started to adopt the role of an 
Historical, Sectoral or Truth Commission. 
It is important to note that, despite its motto, the Marikana Commission’s terms of 
reference made no mention of ‘truth-telling’, ‘restoration’ or ‘justice’. Due to its status as 
an official investigative commission, part of its role involved hearing the testimony of 
witnesses and families of the deceased miners within a public forum. However, the 
apparent aims and official discourse of ‘truth-telling’, justice and ‘restoration’ or healing 
was undermined by the requisite methodology to fulfil the commission’s legal mandate of 
objective fact finding. Interestingly, an attorney working on the team of the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC) stated, correctly, that the legislation that defines commissions of 
inquiry in South Africa “has no transitional justice element”.286 When compared to the 
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PNUR Act that established the TRC and its provisions facilitating full disclosure and 
reconciliation, the Commissions Act provides limited space for public ‘truth-telling’ or the 
acknowledgment of victim-centred personal, narrative or dialogic truth. 
One can actually point to more similarities between the Marikana Commission and the 
JRC and the Wessels Commission. Victim participation at the Marikana Commission was 
severely constrained. As Fanie du Toit wrote, “victims appear to struggle to make their 
voices heard and participate fully for a lack of funding, whereas the police, with state 
money, can afford to hire a range of top silks.”287 The lack of funding to which du Toit 
refers concerned funding for legal representation.  
In general the Marikana Commission defaulted to the ‘regime of truth’ constituted by legal 
approaches and forensic argumentation. Like the TRC’s amnesty hearings, the Marikana 
Commission’s investigative phase resembled a quasi-judicial process. The effect on the 
Commission’s process resonates with Van Krieken’s assertion on ‘truth’ and the court of 
law -- that there were no extra-legal truths, and no facts with autonomous status, from 
the perspective of the Marikana Commission. Indeed, ‘truth’ was conceived as knowledge 
either in favour of one party or another. I shall use the example of the testimony of one of 
the surviving miners, Mzoxolo Magidiwana, who was himself shot multiple times by the 
police on the 16th August 2012, as a focal point from which to reach some conclusions.288 
Magidiwana was subjected to days of cross-examination, where his statements were 
questioned and probed as to their truth and validity, particularly by SAPS attorneys. Like 
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the local Sharpeville witnesses at the Wessels Commission, when Magidiwana gave 
testimony at the Commission he was not only a man bearing witness; he was an alleged 
criminal.289 Ngalwana, one of the SAPS attorneys, stated repeatedly that Magidiwana 
could be judged a liar, saying “if you fail to tell the truth and you are discovered, you will 
have committed a criminal offense”.290 Although Farlam intervened stating that 
“anything you say cannot be used against you if you were subsequently charged,”291 the 
framing of the commission’s proceedings as an adversarial trial encompassed an effective 
scheme of legitimation that made Magidiwana’s ‘truth-telling’ appear to carry similar 
weight. In this sense, the commission engaged in the same performance, or ritual, of legal 
tradition seen in other ‘tumult commissions’. 
At one stage of his cross-examination Magidiwana was shown footage of the shooting and 
was asked whether he could see that the police were retreating. As he watched the footage, 
Magidiwana responded, “Sir, these police officers are shooting and this person is falling 
and as this person is falling, he is facing the road.”292 However, as he began recounting 
his own narrative of events he was cut short when Judge Farlam reminded him that he 
had not answered the question. Fraught with distress, Magidiwana banged his hand on 
the table. He was reprimanded for this, and he then began to cry. Clearly, the Marikana 
Commission’s ritual was quite unlike that which Boraine depicts in his account of the TRC 
victims hearings -- devoid of ‘stern-faced officials’ to probe narratives. To the contrary, 
although like the TRC the Marikana commission promised ‘truth, restoration, and 
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justice’; it is clear that the regime of truth in which it operated was ‘truth as objective fact’, 
which relied on the forensic procedure and principles of a courtroom to legitimate its 
findings.  
But, the Marikana Commission also represented unresolved tensions, reflecting broader 
unresolved tensions in South African society. It was the first ‘Tumult Commission’ to 
occur in democratic South Africa, and indeed, post-TRC South Africa. Its context is a 
South Africa whose laws are subject to a justiciable Constitution and bill of rights, where 
citizens are aware of their rights, including the right to ‘free speech’. Unlike Ashforth’s 
‘grand tradition’ of ‘Native Question’ commissions of inquiry that functioned to 
(re)produce colonial state power, the Marikana Commission was utilised, by some, as a 
platform from which to challenge the ‘official’ narrative of events maintained by the 
police. The actual proceedings revealed the contradictions of an official process 
subscribing to objectives of ‘truth-seeking, justice and restoration’, but whose terms of 
reference were concerned with responsibility for political violence only. It became clear 
that Police Commissioner Riyah Piyega lied at the Commission, and failed to produce 
important evidence.293 And as Evidence Leader Adv. Geoff Budlender stated in a personal 
interview, it is widely acknowledged that “the police had constructed a version [of the 
events] which wasn’t the truth.”294 
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This was at odds with the Marikana Commission’s final report. The report presented a 
strange hybrid of the TRC discourse of truth-telling and accountability, whilst at the same 
time remaining faithful to the discourse of tragedy characteristic of ‘Tumult Commissions’ 
that attempted to exonerate the police from accountability for the taking of lives:  
“It is understandable that an institution would attempt to shield itself from 
criticism in a situation such as this, and that it would be reluctant to invite criticism 
by explicitly or implicitly acknowledging mistakes that were made. That, however, 
is what is required of the SAPS. It has a duty of public accountability and truth-
telling, because it exercises force on behalf of all South Africans, and all South 
Africans are entitled to know whether what was done in their name was 
justified.”295 
To do this, the Commission engaged many lawyers (nearly sixty at one point), resulting 
in lengthy cross-examinations and disputes over due process. Certainly, the involvement 
of legal experts was essential to identify the untruth of the police’s testimony. However, 
as the Commission carried out its work the ambiguity of its status and function worsened, 
especially in the understanding of participating witnesses. The passage below exemplifies 
this, when Magidiwana, under cross-examination, began to pose questions and 
accusations at the attorney questioning him.  
MR MAGIDIWANA: Is it not true that on certain days you ask the same things and 
not ask everything on the same day, others you ask later.296 
MR NGALWANA: It is irrelevant; I’m not going to answer your questions. Please 
answer my question.297 
                                                          
295Marikana Commission Report. Chapter 13, ‘The Plan, its Defects and Execution’. Section 1101 [Emphasis Mine] 
296 Note that this has been translated from isiXhosa, and therefore may not be an identical representation of what 
Magidiwana meant. However, this is from the transcription of the proceedings.  




And on another day,  
MR MAGIDIWANA: Yes, You have a reason to talk like that, Sir, because you 
defend the people that you know they are criminals. 
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Magidiwana… It’s not appropriate for you to say that he 
knows that his clients are criminals; he knows that the case he is putting up is a 
bad case. That’s not your function to do that. At the end of the day when we’ve 
heard all the evidence and heard all the arguments, we will decide whether the 
police have behaved as badly as you say they have, whether they are criminals, or 
we may have to make similar findings about other people. But it’s for us to make 
the findings at the end, it’s not for you to just gratuitously throw around comments 
like that. Please answer the questions you’re asked.298 
It seems that the Marikana Commission of Inquiry was characterised by the same 
impasses and ambiguities in status and function that plagued the TRC. The Commission 
was not a court of law. Yet, as an investigative commission, the officials attempted to steer 
the proceedings to follow legal protocol in order to authorise the Commission’s eventual 
findings to speak truth with power, as made evident in Judge Farlam’s statement “we will 
decide”. Nonetheless, Magidiwana directly challenged the conventional protocol by 
engaging in a re-negotiation of power in terms of what for him was a more democratic 
space in which he could speak truth to power. Farlam was ostensibly clear that it is not 
Magidiwana’s ‘function to do that’. To accord with the Commission’s official legitimating 
scheme, Magidiwana’s function was to serve as a mere vessel from which ‘truth as 
objectivity’ could be extracted and scrutinised to support an officially validated narrative 
of events. However, Farlam’s insistence that “we will decide whether the police…are 
criminals” raises critical questions concerning the role and function of the Commission. 
                                                          




As was the case with the legal status of the TRC’s perpetrator findings, the same question 
holds concerning the findings of the Marikana Commission. Is it appropriate for a 
Commission of Inquiry, as an investigative body and not a legal tribunal, to make findings 
of criminal liability? It seems that it is not. It is unclear what the relationship is between 
these findings -- made in general terms, i.e. that SAPS is collectively responsible -- and 
their application to individual cases of criminal liability. To recall Mill’s impassioned 
statement on the findings of the JRC, as a principle of government by law, when there is 
evidence that lives have been “improperly taken”, only a court of law, or a criminal 
tribunal, can determine the criminality of an individual, and determine his or her proper 
punishment. 
5.3 Old Grains from new Husks 
As a heuristic, Sitze’s notion of ‘Tumult Commissions’ remains useful to capture the 
practise of implementing official investigations to establish ‘the truth’ concerning 
unlawful state killings and their particular whitewashing function of exonerating the 
security forces from accountability. Each account -- in the reports of the JRC, the Wessels 
Commission, the TRC, and now, the Marikana Commission -- traversed a great deal of 
ground, exemplifying major shifts in historical and political context. Despite the altered 
contexts, these ‘Tumult Commissions’ each confronted the intractable and profound 
problems involved in how societies choose to deal with basic issues of truth and 
accountability. Another diachronic issue is that of contested sovereignty of the law vis-a-
vis the state, in providing for the security of human life.  
Following the chronology of ‘Tumult Commissions’ might provide different vantage 




epochs. In reckoning with a perceived social problem, while seeking possible solutions for 
the future, the state availed itself of the juridical forms at hand, in accordance with what 
was practical and politically expedient given the particular political context. With 
reference to Luxemburg’s beautiful metaphor of ‘new grains breaking through old husks’ 
cited above, and in light of the recent Marikana Massacre that saw security forces shooting 
some 40 striking mineworkers, and described as “arguably… the most devastating single 
event in the history of South Africa since 1994,”299  one must ask the question whether the 
‘new movement’ did find its own forms and language to respond to the Marikana 
massacre. Significantly it is referred to, not as a ‘massacre’ but as the Marikana tragedy 
in official discourse? The term ‘massacre’ itself became contested at the Commission and parties 
at the Commission were obliged to use the term tragedy, which implied a more neutral stance on 
judgements of blame.  Judge Farlam stated: “whether it’s a massacre is a matter we’ll decide at 
the end of the day.”300 More generally the question is whether, or to what extent, the TRC 
initiated a more open and inclusive politics of truth in official approaches to reckoning 
with state sanctioned violence in the suppression of civic action? The TRC evidently left 
an irrevocable imprint upon the narrative of the Marikana Commission, in its choice to 
invoke the official discourse of truth, restoration and justice that framed South Africa’s 
transition. This reveals an explicit attempt to counter and alleviate public critiques of the 
Commission. 
The Marikana massacre ruptured the narrative that ‘gross human rights violations’ 
inflicted by the state are a thing of the past and the Commission was an official attempt 
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to narrate and to understand that rupture. The few who have written on the topic to date, 
such as Peter Alexander, have referred to the event as a “vantage point” -- an event 
involving “sequences of activity released by ruptures” providing a position from which to 
examine deeper causal currents, and at the same time make predictions of their long-term 
effects.301 Scholars of political economy argue that the root causes of the miners’ strike is 
the structure of South Africa’s mining industry: its predatory labour practices and the vile 
working and living conditions for miners,302 while these conditions are posited as a direct 
legacy of the colonial era and the Apartheid regime.303 The conditions of migrant 
labourers in South Africa remain much the same despite the transition to democracy.304 
Unfortunately, the Marikana Commission of inquiry never reached phase two due to 
insufficient time.305 This was the phase in which it was to focus on the systemic causes, or 
the ‘macro-truth’, that may have contributed to circumstances that catalysed the massacre 
as well as on the question of financial compensation for the families of deceased miners. 
On this point, the Commission report’s feeble response was that it was “not satisfied that 
its terms of reference are wide enough to cover the question as to whether a compensation 
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scheme of the kind proposed should be implemented by the State.”306 Consequently, 
families of the deceased still engage in legal struggles with the assistance of various Non-
Governmental Organisations to attain some sort of compensation. Instead, the discourse 
of tragedy became the official discourse once again. As Cyril Ramaphosa said at the 
Commission:  
“The tragedy that has occurred at Marikana has to be approached as a collective 
failure, by many role players, many stakeholders. And I don’t think that many who 
had some role to play can say that they do not bear any form of responsibility. I 
think the responsibility has to be collective and as a nation we should dip our heads 
and accept that we did fail the people of Marikana, particularly the families and the 
workers and those who died. We did fail them.”307 
Invoking the tragic narrative whereby everyone was the blame, and hence, no one was to 
blame, suggests that the Marikana Commission was indeed a ‘whitewashing’ machine 
used as a tool to legitimate the ‘truth of state’. 
Moreover, based upon the ANC government’s dismissive behaviour towards the miners 
and families of the deceased both during the Commission as well as since, it does not 
appear that the ANC government used the Commission as an opportunity to engage in 
genuine self-reflection. The latent ‘truth’ is that millions of South Africans continue to 
suffer gross socio-economic deprivation and civic protests are daily occurrences. As the 
ANC government feels increasingly threatened by political faction and widespread social 
unrest for matters from wage increases to university fee cuts, it is not clear that the ‘truth’ 
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offered by the Marikana Commission of inquiry will be sufficient to provide justice, nor 
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